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“Palestine as a Woman”: 
Feminizing Resistance and Popular Literature
Laura Khoury and Seif  Dana
Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin
Parkside, 900 Wood Rd., Kenosha, WI  53144  U.S.A.
Ghazi-Walid Falah
Department of Public Administration and Urban Studies, The University
of Akron, OH 44325-7904 U.S.A.
At the present time, when desires to resist are being conscripted, the rich history of
historic Palestine is being devalued, and significant concepts (such as resistance)
have become inferiorized, particular powerful metaphors such as “Palestine as a
woman” are maintained to subvert dominant thinking that re-inscribes colonial
relations, and Palestinian women have collectively defied liberation, firmly wielded
the weapons of the struggle contained in their culture, spoken a united language of
resistance, and unearthed the colonial cultural matrix by feminizing resistance. The
significance of the representation of Palestinian women in popular literary works
reverberates in the symbols of Palestine, Beirut, Resistance, and the Palestinian
Uprising (Intifada). Three renowned Palestinian intellectuals whose work
informed the popular and national liberation discourse after the Nakba (the occu-
pation of Palestine in 1948) have elaborated significantly on the interlacing of
social and national liberation in the case of Palestine and, by implication, have
contributed to the formation of women’s gender identity: the metaphor of
“Palestine as a woman and women as Palestine” is found in the works of the
novelist Ghassan Kanafani, the cartoonist Naji al-Ali, and the poet Mahmoud
Darwish. This article offers a framework for understanding the significance of this
powerful metaphor as it developed in the context of conflict and war in Palestine.
Using a grounded theory approach, the authors analyze selected popular literary
works and explore how women’s world is woven into the practice of everyday resis-
tance, or “feminized resistance.” This process involves reconfiguring a pattern—
away from Western gender politics—by confronting the rigid dichotomy of public
versus private domains, de-framing domestic responsibilities, de-constraining
national identity, and re-imagining feminism within the context of national oppres-
sion. The authors use James C. Scott’s hypothesis that “hidden transcripts,” or the
undeclared, essentially individual forms of women’s resistance, create a culture, a
movement, a nation of resistance. 
Key words: feminizing resistance, “Palestine as a woman,” nativist nostalgia,
homeland, exile
À l’heure actuelle, quand les désirs de résister sont mobilisés, la riche histoire de la
Palestine historique est dévaluée. Des concepts importantes, comme la résistance
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sont maintenant infériorisés, et des métaphores particulièrement puissantes, telle
que la représentation de la « Palestine comme femme » sont maintenues pour saper
la pensée dominante qui ré- inscrit les relations coloniales. Collectivement, les
femmes palestiniennes ont fait face à la libération, en maniant fermement les armes
de la lutte contenues dans leur culture, en parlant le langage unifié de la résistance,
et en mettant au grand jour la matrice culturelle coloniale en féminisant la résis-
tance. L’importance de la représentation des femmes palestiniennes dans les œuvres
littéraires populaires résonne dans les symboles de la Palestine, de Beyrouth, de la
Résistance et du soulèvement palestinien (l’Intifada). Trois intellectuels palesti-
niens de renom dont le travail a nourri le discours de libération nationale et popu-
laire après la Nakba (l’occupation de la Palestine en 1948) ont développé de
manière significative les intrications entre la libération sociale et la nationale dans
le cas de la Palestine et  ont contribué par là à la formation de l’identité de genre
des femmes. On trouve la métaphore de la «Palestine comme femme » et des
« femmes comme Palestine » dans les œuvres du romancier Ghassan Kanafani, du
caricaturiste Naji al-Ali, et du poète Mahmoud Darwich. Cet article propose un
cadre interprétatif pour comprendre la signification de cette puissante métaphore
telle qu’elle a évolué dans le contexte de conflit et de guerre en Palestine. En utili-
sant une approche par le biais de la théorie ancrée, les auteurs analysent certaines
œuvres littéraires populaires et explorent comment le monde des femmes est intégré
dans la pratique de la résistance quotidienne  ou de la « résistance féminisée ». Ce
processus implique la reconfiguration d’un motif qui – en s’éloignant de la politique
occidentale du genre – défie la dichotomie rigide entre les domaines du public et du
privé, recadre les responsabilités domestiques, libère l’identité nationale, et imagine
le féminisme sous un autre angle dans le contexte de l’oppression nationale. Les
auteurs utilisent l’hypothèse de James C. Scott que les « transcriptions cachées »
ou non-déclarées, essentiellement des formes individuelles de résistance féminine,
créent une culture, un mouvement et une nation de résistance.
Mots clés : féminiser la résistance, « la Palestine comme femme », nostalgie nati-
viste, patrie, exil, Palestine
Introduction
We have on this earth what makes life worth living: on this
earth, the Lady of Earth, mother of all beginnings and ends.
She was called Palestine. Her name later became Palestine. My
Lady, because you are my Lady, I deserve life. 
—Mahmoud Darwish, “On This Earth”
While the constant reinvention of the category of gender and the forma-
tion of gender relations might seem, in its most radical form, a site of
social antagonism and conflict, it becomes a less orthodox process when
it takes place in the context of colonial relations. These processes not only
become highly entwined with national liberation but may even signify the
success or failure of the whole liberation venture. The hegemonic repre-
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sentations of women in political literature and literary and cultural forms
signify not only the agenda discrepancy of the various social forces
involved in the anti-colonial struggle but also their perception of the
nature of the colonial venture itself  (e.g., colonial relations vs. colonial
boots on the ground). Therefore, investigating hegemonic representations
of women at various stages may reveal the state and conditions of the
anti-colonial and liberation scheme. 
Reconsidering the status and role of women in national biographies
is central to rewriting national histories and exposing the male- and elite-
oriented accounts to justify and reinforce existing gender and class rela-
tions. Equally important is the impact of research on gender that
uncritically accepts Western frameworks, concepts, and meanings of
gender as universal. Palestinian women may see themselves transforming
their collective identity and gender roles, challenge dominant accounts of
their history, and thus offer alternative versions of the national past. are
Palestinian women reproducing the nation? (For an argument that
women are biological, cultural, and symbolic reproducers of the nation,
see Yuval-Davis 1997.)
The ideological significance of studying representations in academic
discourse is to bring to the forefront the ignored role of women in cultural
resistance, as symbols of the homeland, and the suppressive ways in which
colonial spatial relations are constituted as gendered. Mills (2005) exam-
ines the possibilities of developing a materialist feminist analysis of repre-
sentational and lived space. She draws attention to the differences
between Western feminism and indigenous women, though the latter had
a role in the way Western women defined themselves spatially within the
colonial context. In addition, “the ideological strictures on women’s
movement within the colonial zone were important in shaping a notion of
a woman’s place” (2005, 68). Thus, any discourse on representation needs
to be based on indigenous materialist re-evaluation of spatial relations.
No analysis of the discourse of representation can be comprehensive
if  ideologies are not perceived as embedded in processes of globalization
and how gender serves as a resource for capital. Gender is embedded in
the process of restructuring and in ongoing global processes (Connell
2000). This also implies that in core countries, as Connell suggests, insti-
tutions are gendered and, in turn, directly influence masculinity in the
periphery. Palestinian women in the periphery inherit the low value of
domestic labour that is maintained by globalization and transform it into
a practice of resistance to occupation. Mohanty (2002) shows that colo-
nized men were in fact “feminized” by European occupiers. 
Resistance to colonialism and to processes of globalization that
oppress women in the periphery has created forms of gendered spheres of
resistance. But this is not done by feminizing domestic and private spheres
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and masculinizing the public sphere. The irony is that Palestinian women,
as we will discuss, feminized resistance, or made up a disproportionate
number of those who contributed to the resistance, simply because
distinctions between public and private were blurred. We argue below that
reproducing the feminization of resistance is a function of feminizing the
landscape in concepts such as “Palestine as a woman.” To bring space into
the analysis, and to avoid the taken-for-granted Western concepts and
constructions of the category of gender, we must identify the counter-
hegemonic conceptualization and discourse. 
There are implications to this indeed. What may be viewed as a distor-
tion of Western conceptualizations is in fact a reshaping of Palestinian
women’s representations and the construction of a resistance ritual that
shaped their daily lives. This is not to suggest that men are not resisting,
but we live in times—under the Palestinian authority—in which the
meaning of national resistance to occupation come to be equated with
terrorism as part of this silencing of the subaltern. Within this context,
feminizing resistance becomes an important venue for preserving the
integrity of indigenous knowledges. It was probably less significant in the
pre-Oslo era. Palestinian women have constituted a self-conscious voice
of dissent, revived the language of resistance, preserved the internal
integrity of indigenous culture, and basically practised cultural resistance
in their everyday lives.
Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2005, 324) writes that “Palestinian women are
the unrecognized frontline fighters who, if  acknowledged, could reveal a
different reality by presenting a different voice and a revisionist
discourse.” In an interview, a Gazan woman tells her story:
I am like all other Palestinian women that live in Gaza and survived. I will not
die from poverty either but I am stronger when I see our men resist those who
killed my son ahmad. I am a proud mother. I recall how my son before he was
killed asked me to take him to the amusement park but I told him we cannot go
because we do not have the money for it but he left the house and a bomb shell
fell on him (Interview with authors, 2013).
We do not present ethnographic work in this article, but we stress the
need to do such work. Palestinian women, we argue, have continued their
“ideological resistance,” manifested in efforts to reconstitute a “shattered
community, to save or restore the sense and fact of community against all
the pressures of the colonial system” (Said 1993, 209). The cultural resis-
tance symbolism in Palestinian women that has significantly character-
ized the period since the 1948 Nakba, we argue, has many practical
implications, ranging from blurring the private and private domains to
transcending domestic labour as a tool for collective behaviour. 
It is worth noting here that in the present Palestinian authority era,
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scholars have identified some shifts in women’s self-representation, but
this is due to the weakening of the links between everyday struggles for
family and community survival and political resistance (see Johnson
2009). We do not suggest that this analysis is faulty but, rather, build on
it. Johnson (2009) revises the three categories of women’s self-representa-
tion introduced by Sayyigh (1998): the “struggle personality,” character-
ized by strength, courage, and resourcefulness; the “confrontational
personality” that is the generation of the revolution; and the “witness to
tragedy” personality. Johnson (2009) explores a shift in the iconic image
of women in the Palestinian national struggle as the mother of the martyr
and maternal sacrifice as a symbol of the extent of Palestinian loss and
suffering, explaining the reasons for the shift:
Yet the erosion of solidarity, trust in the Palestinian national project, and the
capacities of its leadership narrows her field of action to her own family and
constricts her abilities even there … Both the hard necessity of public struggle
and dreams of domesticity sit uneasily in the selves … But for both, the public is
deeply troubled and the domestic highly threatened. What remains is persis-
tence, a crucial element of Palestinian survival but one infected by contradiction
and marked by a deep uncertainty about the future (Johnson 2009, 44–45).
It is for exactly this reason that this article was conceptualized. It may
not delve into this uncertainty, but does counter it by reviving the
symbolic culture of resistance in “Palestine as a woman.” This article
complements our work elsewhere (Khoury and Dana 2012), which aims
to enhance the visibility of settler colonialism’s impact on the internal
landscape (how the mind is colonized). In that earlier article we show that
there is an unexamined quest to supplant an imperial subjectivity, but that
a self-conscious voice is embedded in the indigenous culture. Here we
discuss the inherent rationality for feminizing resistance in the concept of
“Palestine as a woman.” We have defined resistance as “a deliberate exclu-
sion of ‘others’ as a means of preserving internal integrity of indigenous
knowledge” (Khoury and Dana 2012, 189). One indigenous Palestinian
construction of the national homeland is the “Palestine as a woman”
concept and the discourse around it.
The Subaltern’s Collective Defiance
Few studies have discussed gendering landscape (see Falkiner 1992).
Landscape here refers to a representation of anything with an imagined
space, but how gendering the homeland affects the conception of resis-
tance remains unexplored, especially in the context of the Palestinian
cause. The discourse on the land as a Palestinian lady (as Darwish writes,
“because you are my lady I deserve life …”) after the Nakba may echo
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other discourses in the West, where the association between land and
gender is made in notions such as “Mother Nature,” but we argue that the
land of Palestine has been inscribed with a representation that associates
the discourse of the occupation with women, so it is commonly called
“raped land” (as opposed to “occupied land”). Therefore, our main
premise here is that this discourse (Palestine as a woman) constructs
Palestinian women as national signifiers, whereas both al-ard (the land)
and gender are initially cultural constructs. The characterization of al-ard
in literary works, we argue, has a direct bearing on Palestinian women’
self-identification and representation. These representations have been
further invested in perceptions of women as courageous, patient, and
loyal.
The cultural representation of Palestinian women in popular literary
works reverberates in the symbols of Palestine, Beirut, and the Palestinian
uprising (intifada), constituting the homeland as a signifier of women.
This, we argue, has shaped and constantly reshapes consciousness of
Palestinian women’s representation in the nation. The significance of
“Palestine as a woman” is to make the land a national signifier. The
expressive culture of resistance, as reflected by the popular and classical
literary works of three renowned Palestinian intellectuals whose work
informed the popular discourse after the 1948 Nakba, especially
contributed to the formation of women’s gender frame. The theme of
“Palestine as a woman and women as Palestine” in the work of the
novelist Ghassan Kanafani, the cartoonist Naji al-ali, and the poet
Mahmoud Darwish contributed to “feminizing resistance” (intifada as
female) or the de-gendered construction of resistance, which involves
reconfiguring a pattern—not patterned around Western gender politics—
by de-constraining the re-imagining of feminism within the context of
national and colonial oppression.
Fiction and other literary works, we argue, have direct implications
for Palestinian women’ self-identification and representation, but
Palestinian women have extended those undeclared activities (see Scott
1985, 1990, on “hidden transcripts”), essentially surrounding individual
forms of women’s resistance, and have thus managed to create a culture,
a movement, a nation of resistance. In other words, particular discourses
that feminized resistance can also explain why Palestinian women are
reproducing their nation (see Yuval-Davis 1997). There is a relationship
between the political dispossession of Palestinians as an outcome of the
1948 Nakbaand the production of a political discourse conductive to
feminizing resistance.
Reconsidering the status and role of women in national biographies
is central to rewriting national histories and exposing how they are often
represented by male- and elite-oriented accounts to justify and reinforce
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existing gender and class relations. Equally important is the impact of
research on gender that uncritically accepts Western frameworks,
concepts, and meanings of gender. Palestinian women may see themselves
transforming their collective identity and gender roles and challenging
dominant accounts of history, and thus may offer alternative versions of
the national past. How is the discourse of “Palestine as a woman”
furthering their efforts to reproduce the nation (see Yuval-Davis 1997) in
a special way not found in the West? The next section delves into the repre-
sentation of Palestinian women.
Palestinian Women Foreground the Accountability of 
Palestinian Symbols
Human geography concerns itself  with, among other things, how humans
represent land; cultural geography concerns itself  with social and issues in
the contingent nature of culture and forms of resistance. One way of
bridging the two, as suggested by Jackson (2000), is by rematerializing
social and cultural geography. This transcendence may represent the best
framework for this article because the material basis—the land of historic
Palestine—exists no matter who calls this land what. “Palestine as a
woman” transmits through culture to many generations and continually
reshapes the representation of women. Concurrently, resistance has
become a central theme of contemporary social and cultural geography
(Pile and Keith 1997). There are obvious connections between human
emplacement and impersonal geographies; because resistance is not
located in certain practices or places, we find that the mapping of resis-
tance is achieved by attending to its outcomes. 
Western assumptions and discourses on the gendered nature of
nationalism were thoroughly argued by feminist scholars in the 1990s (see
Lake 1992; McClintock 1995) who entertained the conceptualization of
nationalist identity as a male phenomenon and project. Challenging this
notion by attending to strong national sentiments among women or other
venues of research is not futile, but nor is it necessary. In the very special
circumstances of the Palestinian cause, we argue, the identity of women
has been interwoven with the notion of “Palestine as a woman,” as
hypothesized in the popular and classic literature of the Nakba of 1948. 
Jean-Klein (2001), aware of the relationship between nationalism
and gender, proposes a seminal argument that should have led the disci-
pline in a new direction and, in our view, does not follow the Western path.
It is not necessarily true that the gendering of the nation exists in the
Third World—especially in nations that remain under colonial rule. Jean-
Klein in fact proposes that in the available analysis of the nationalizing
process, there is a determined politics of nationalism, as if  it were deter-
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mined or inscribed, and people lack authentic interest in nationalist
activism. It is not prescribed/inscribed on the people, but Palestinian
women practised domestic self-nationalization (her argument will be reit-
erated in other parts below).
Jean-Klein references some scholars (Brubaker 1996) who have
perceived a new mission for nationalism studies in post-colonial settings.1
In general, subaltern studies allow for an indigenous interpretation of
processes and cultural constructs, because these settings are inextricably
connected with colonial struggles. “Thus it now stands as a fact that Third
World or postcolonial nationalisms do not add up to the same phenom-
enon as ‘nationalism’ in its (notorious) Western expressions: They are not
ethnicity-focused, not exclusive, not Other-oppressive, and not hege-
monic: they are subaltern, self-liberational, and virtuous” (Jean-Klein
2001, 85). In sum, she calls for referencing transformative agency as
opposed to discursive determined agency. abu-Lughod (1990, 42) argues
that the importance of looking at resistance is as “diagnostic of power.”
Resistance must become feminized so that its oeuvre is maintained.
Rising Above the Staged Drama: Background in Refugee Studies
Studies of urban Palestinian women who are educated and politically
active seem to be appealing to many, but such studies cannot include
women living in the Gaza Strip (see Roy 1986), refugee camps in the West
Bank (see Rubenberg 2001), or refugees in the arab world (see Sayyigh
1998). anthropologists have provided valuable ethnographies and
explored how Palestinian women in refugee camps in Lebanon define
themselves as minorities to accommodate their isolation from the larger
Palestinian context and protest their powerlessness in the local Lebanese
context as a strategy of survival (Peteet 1992). Because Palestinian
refugee women saw national oppression as predominant, consciousness
of class and gender oppression remained in the background. 
Palestinian women rose above the staged drama before their inferi-
ority was epidermalized. Resistance to colonization has redefined gender
roles among Palestinian women.2 The Nakba of 1948 did not have equal
effects on different geographical areas; unusually, cities today tend to be
more conservative in their perception of women’s roles. Before the Nakba,
some Palestinian cities had cultural centres, cultural production, and
literary work that surpassed those of most other arab cities at the time.
For example, Haifa had movie theatres, cultural centres, a film industry,
and some of the best poets in the arab world, including Ibrahim Tukan
of Nablus, author of the poem “Mawtini” (“My Home”), one of the most
recited contemporary poems and the national anthem of some arab
countries. Cities in Palestine, as everywhere else, were more developed and
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progressive than rural areas, and when the Zionist movement occupied
Palestine, they intentionally demolished a dozen cities in Palestine and no
less than 418 rural localities (Khalidi 1992; Falah 1996). Significantly,
according to Susan Slyomovics (1998, 208), the “Palestinian woman
[metamorphic ally] is made to stand for the destroyed villages and dispos-
sessed land. She represents the ‘national allegory’ of the lost Palestine
homeland in much literary and visual imagery as the feminine sphere
reproducing, literally and figuratively, the nation.”
The new environment in the Palestinian refugee camps (in the dias-
pora or in the West Bank) after the Nakba forced women to redefine
gender roles; in particular, they had to seek jobs and contribute to their
livelihood. In fact, urban women lagged behind women in the refugee
camps in terms of their gender roles. Resistance and the hegemony of
nationalist and leftist ideologies also redefined women’s roles. The resis-
tance that developed 17 years later, with the creation of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), was detached from that cultural base and
delayed by its abolition. The core of the revolution was in the camps—
inside and outside Palestine—and political activism spread out mostly in
refugee camps and much less in cities. a portion of the progressive ideolo-
gies was born there and grew rapidly in this new isolated environment.
This explains why cities lagged behind when women in refugee camps
were developing their gender roles more progressively. The resistance, and
most of the popular literature, perceived women as equal, and this
affected Palestinian communities to a significant extent. 
Peteet (1992) explores the stability and fragility of women’s socio-
political advancement under changing political, organizational, and
economic conditions. During the period of the Palestinian resistance in
Lebanon, structures of gender domination were reproduced and trans-
formed at the same time, and the effect of the resistance on gendered
forms of power and the division of labour was uneven. Similarly, one can
argue that the peculiar circumstances of exilic existence crystallized both
a female political consciousness and, perhaps, a feminist sensibility. The
alienation of exile and revolutionary nationalism could not help but
transform relations between men and women, as well as those among
women themselves.
In a recent paradigm shift, “feminists have extended the framing of
social rights to include family and domestic rights and responsibilities …
While some theorists continue to ignore the spheres of home … There is
a growing body of theoretical and empirical literature that has sought to
incorporate questions of home and family” (Hobson, Lewis, and Siim
2002, 46). Coontz (1998), writing on the rise of domestic ideology in
Victorian England, argues that it was middle-class Victorians who
instilled the idea of the family as quintessentially the women’s domain.
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The notion of public versus private domains, therefore, does not typically
apply to disadvantaged and poor women (see Weintraub and Kumar
1997). This distinction, we argue, is not strong among marginalized
Palestinian women; the lines between public and private spaces and
gendered activities are blurred. The conditions of refugee status, with its
miserable economic situation, provided new opportunities and culturally
acceptable roles for women in education, work, and other spheres. 
Three points should be emphasized here. First, we view Palestinian
women as being virtually beyond any arbitrary political geography;
Palestinian women’s bodies, we believe, cross the political borders, and
they have a collective trans-identity through their similar socio-political
economic context. This is why we consider the subjects constituted and
addressed in this study to be trans-border bodies that cross territorial
boundaries. While the occupation dispersed Palestinian bodies, nonethe-
less their common refugee status and the representation of women in
popular literature formed a collective gender identity, as we will explore
in this article. 
Second, we chose the most popular literary voices of the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s that represented the subaltern at the time: Naji al-ali,
Ghassam Kanafani, and the poet laureate of Palestine, Mahmoud
Darwish. The writings of many Palestinian feminists are not ignored or
underrepresented, but they do not fit the time frame or the topic we are
addressing—that of resistance. For example, Sahar Khalifeh’s Wild
Thorns ([1975] 1985) includes the viewpoint of women involved in writing
the history of resistance. However, due to the limits of this article, we do
not include their valuable work.
Third, we focus here on providing a synchronic image at a particular
point in time when the notion of “Palestine as a woman” was invigorated,
the status of Palestinian woman was rejuvenated, and, most importantly,
resistance was feminized. This article is a contribution to the investigation
of a cultural product and norm (Palestine as a woman) in relation to a
place and time (historic Palestine); of the way in which a cultural
phenomenon remains constant from one place to another (feminization
of resistance); and of how Palestinian women functioned spatially based
on the cultural product (a collective Palestinian women’s trans-border
identity). The sections that follow present our methodology, set out the
theoretical framework of the study, and deconstruct the presumption of
binary gender roles before presenting our findings.
Methodology
When examining the relationships between resistance and conflict or war,
scholars may, in general, understand gender in accordance with Western
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conceptions. Gender politics may involve more than managing domi-
nance and dissent. What emerges is a tendency to view gender solely as a
form of domination, which may lead critical scholars to devalue resis-
tance without understanding the deep structures of power, national
conflict, and colonial relations, and thus to overlook the everyday acts of
resistance accorded to women themselves. We argue that individual forms
of resistance may become a vigorous form of collective resistance.
Because of this complexity, it is not possible to employ any deductive
methodology that begins with a theory. The most meaningful and appro-
priate methodology, therefore, is a grounded theory approach, which
allows for understanding agency by emphasizing its distinctive gender
attributions. a grounded approach allowed us to formulate a proposition
based on conceptual ideas. With constant comparisons, we developed
generalized relationships and made inductions until we reached a theo-
retical saturation. 
another reason for considering this an appropriate approach is that
grounded theory avoids pre-conceptualizations and definitions of gender
that are predominantly Western in origin and orientation; it curbs the
tendency to go too far in either accepting or dismissing the notion of
gender equality. Yet even with this approach, disagreements may impose
themselves as a reflection of the binary of agency and structure when we
think they could be reinforcing each other. We contend that concepts may
be mutually constitutive. The following section discusses the theoretical
framework we arrived at as a result of the process of finding generalized
relationships between concepts. 
Conceptual Framework
Clear sexual division in war, however, usually disappears when
there is no clear difference between “battlefront” and the “home
front” (Yuval-Davis 1997).
In his formulation of “everyday forms of resistance,” Scott (1985)
focuses on the undeclared essential forms of resistance that create “a
culture, a movement, a nation” of resistance. In his work on the “hidden
transcripts” (Scott 1990), he explores subtle activities that require no
coordination—and have the advantage of falling short of open defiance.
These actions (e.g., reproduction) rarely have social significance individ-
ually, but collectively they are significant. Following Scott, abu-Lughod
(1990), in her work on the romance of resistance, and other feminist
scholars and women-centred studies of gender resistance in everyday life
have viewed the domestic realm as a site of political expression. Feminist
analyses theorize motherhood and women’s domestic activities as a form
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of incipient or substitutive emancipatory activism (Werbner 1999).
Resistance is thus present, but not in the eyes of the colonizer or of the
dominant, elite, and powerful. Scott’s term “hidden transcripts” refers
also to more symbolic things such as the bondage and insulation that are
based on Palestinian women’s own distinct ways of being and knowing.
Thus, in the long run, these small, subtle acts continually and cumula-
tively promote significant movement toward meaningful manifestations
of change. a ritual is developed as an outcome of women’s collective iden-
tity. For example, there is a cultural expression of “sacrifice” involving an
ethos of non-celebration, which represents what Scott (1990) calls
“weapons of the weak.” This constitutes a technique of resistance specific
to Palestinian women. 
Jean-Klein (2001) analyzed the Palestinian practice of suspending
everyday life as a form of domestic self-nationalization as well as a form of
resistance. This practice, she contends, has hegemonic as well as liberatory
overtones. Her “thick description” of the Palestinian case demonstrates
that 
domestic, familial, and personal activism can in specific situations work as
coeval partner to formally organized efforts, that the continuity of domestic
activity with collective political action is not invariably a gender-specific
phenomenon or exclusively counter-hegemonic, and that “subalternness” is a
relational and situational positioning, not a determinate geopolitical space and
moral zone (Jean-Klein 2001, 91).
Domestic self-nationalization, for Jean-Klein, is a process “wherein ordi-
nary persons fashion themselves into nationalized subjects, using distinc-
tive narrative actions and embodied practices that are woven into the
practice of everyday life” (2001, 91).
In our view, because resistance is part of  the everyday lives of
Palestinian women in refugee camps, their activism can indeed have
both oppressive and emancipatory effects. abu-Lughod’s (1990)
conception of  “romanticizing resistance” and Jean-Klein’s (2001)
“domestic self-nationalization,” which is based on everyday political
activism, project a different nationalism than is inscribed and engraved
by the elite women’s movement and the Palestinian authority. Inspired
by Scott’s (1990) “hidden transcripts,” we combined the two major
concepts and introduced what we define as “feminizing resistance.” In
order to address and contextualize this complex issue, we will decon-
struct the presumption of  a gender-role binary in “doing resistance”
among marginalized women and elaborate on the development of  ritu-
alized forms of  resistance. 
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Deconstructing the Presumption of a Gender Role Binary
Feminism in its third wave transgresses boundaries through
“deconstructing the presumption of a gender binary or the
conventional ways of doing politics” (alldred and Dennison
2000, 126).
Questions such as “Can Muslim women become empowered and emanci-
pated?” or “Can you be a feminist while being veiled?” are faulty and
inherently Eurocentric. Collective identities should be continually negoti-
ated in relation to their imagined audiences and should never be perma-
nently fixed. For example, Johnson and Kuttab (2001) contend that
informal women’s activism has taken the form of an extension of women’s
roles, particularly in the first intifada, when older women sheltered youth
and defied soldiers. 
“While in the 1990s, US women were appropriately taken up with
different projects to do with continuing to improve gender equality and
organizing around women’s needs, women in the rest of the world were in
different situations, with different needs and agendas” (Kaplan 2003, 10).
Ien ang (1995, 57) writes that “non-white, non-Western women in
‘white/Western’ societies can only begin to speak with a hesitating ‘I’m a
feminist, but …’ in which the meaning and substance of feminism itself
becomes problematized.” Some scholars have encouraged the practice of
focusing on women’s responsibilities rather than on their supposed qual-
ities; according to Hobson and Lister (2002, 26), “this approach is less
likely than maternalism to lend itself  to a biological essentialism that
reifies the difference between women and men.” Indeed, some proponents
of this view would argue that they are attempting to “de-gender” citizen-
ship. This approach, we contend, does not reduce identity to a single posi-
tion but manifests blurring the distinction between private and public
realms. 
another group of scholars has taken a similar approach to investi-
gating ecofeminism, considering the primacy of ecology in their analysis
(see Gillis, Howie, and Munford 2004). Saadallah (2004) studied Muslim
feminism in what came to be called a “third wave,” which refers to
possessing a globalized perspective that is inclusive of commonalities
while transcending difference. She writes that
this new wave of feminism represents a new generation of feminism/ists working
towards constructive solution(s) to women’s situation while embracing diversity.
This allows for a feminism which is non-monolithic and a feminism which
responds to the emerging necessities and real issues facing women today rather
than attempting to fit all women into the structures conceptualised by the
second wave. This is not to reject the precepts of the second wave, but to
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acknowledge that contemporary global structures and interactions require a
“new” feminism. In terms of the relationship between Islam and feminism, the
placing of all Islamised discourses in one basket corroborates Mojab’s argument
that postfeminism is only a contemporary version of liberal feminism.
Embracing diversity entails ascertaining the diverse nature of feminism today,
including Muslim feminism (Saadallah 2004, 219; original emphasis).
Saadallah (2004, 217) advocates avoiding “the binaries predominant in
many feminist writings in order to delineate the similar problems which
women face across borders religions and strands while advocating an
expansive definition of the ‘third wave.’” This approach, in our view,
maintains the authenticity of Palestinian women’s experience and self-
definition and leads the way to understanding their national identities. 
With respect to motherhood and the realm of domestic space, other
scholars have used maternalist arguments to make the case for women’s
political citizenship with reference to the qualities and values that women
could bring to the political arena as mothers. For instance, according to
Werbner (1999, 227), “the strength of political motherhood as an
evolving social movement has been to introduce new human qualities into
the public sphere and to define them as equally foundational in the legiti-
mation of the political community.” Other maternalistic conceptualiza-
tions are normally confined to women but have become politically
significant. 
By deconstructing the presumptions of the gender binary, we can
move to discussing how Palestinian women are feminizing resistance. In
Western societies, resistance is a male-dominated undertaking (see
Khoury 2005, 347); in Palestinian camp society, however, women perform
many acts that, left undone, would have curbed the resistance. In other
words, there is a relationship between the “hidden transcripts” and more
overt forms of opposition, such as the boycotting of Israeli goods and
home economies by the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (see
Khoury 1990). However, the hidden forms of resistance require that
women remain within the confines of the home—which, again, may easily
be interpreted as gender inequality if  viewed through a Western lens. In
the lens of marginalized societies, on the other hand, this individual
covert home economy has been instrumental in the success of resistance.
Ganesh et al. (2005) call for greater attention to mobilizing individual
actions toward the collective. We maintain that this has also contributed
to seeing resistance as a woman-initiated act.
Many forms of resistance are treated as gender-specific efforts.
Reproduction is one very popular technique of individual resistance that
is constitutive of feminized resistance. In the Western eye, reproduction
keeps women enslaved in the confines of their homes. In the context of
conflict and the “demographic war,” however, it serves exactly the oppo-
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site purpose: reproduction is viewed by society as an act of resistance,
because more new revolutionaries are being born, but at the same time it
empowers women and moves the locus of power into their hands.
Long (2006) has researched how Palestinian women heighten and
dissolve boundaries politically and advance a radically different kind of
political geography as women in labour are forced to give birth at Israeli
military checkpoints. Their capacity to do so shows the strength of
Palestinian women under occupation to challenge, dismantle, and move
beyond the occupation. Long describes the behaviour of the state toward
its borders using the analogy of abjection. at the height of abjection, or
the separation of a mother from her child, she contends, the perceived (by
Israel) threat of the bodies of pregnant Palestinian women is used to
justify building a separation wall around Palestinian localities. She
explains this relationship clearly:
a Palestinian woman giving birth at the checkpoint exposes this “natural” or
“biological” process as an intensely political one as well. In birthing at the
checkpoint Rula confronts and reinforces the political divide between Israel and
Palestine: she is the obvious candidate for transgression of that divide and yet
she finds the border as solid and sealed as Israel intended. The body has main-
tained its integrity against the threat posed by this birthing woman. and she is a
threat. Rula may seem vulnerable and sacred but what she actually represents is
both the demographic defeat of Israel and the ever present possibility of
“suicide bombings” (Long 2006, 117).
Kanaaneh (2002) discusses the ways in which ideas about Palestinian
women’s pregnant bodies produce and are produced by ideas about
Palestinian nationhood. She demonstrates how Palestinian women bring
in counter-discourses and how they express subtle methods of resistance
to state power and to Jewish-Israeli nationalism. This means that
Palestinian women can express a form of nationalism that is distinctively
their own.
In addition, Palestinian women became very artful in managing their
emotions. Palestinian women who are the mothers of martyrs—meaning
any Palestinian killed by the Israeli occupation forces—celebrate the
deaths of their martyred children as if  they were wedding celebrations.
Managing emotions effectively requires more than skill or simply
imitating other women; it requires seeing oneself  as a female leader in a
group. This emotional display serves to move the whole community
forward. Hurt, depression, and anger are downplayed—which is not to
say that they do not take their toll on women’s health. Here, Palestinian
women are “feminizing resistance.” 
“Feminizing resistance” in Palestinian society became a ritual. The
different forms of Palestinian women’s activism have attracted the atten-
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tion of a number of scholars (see Sabbagh 1998). Some explore how home
and community environments were daily sites of conflict with Israeli
soldiers and how the extension of women’s roles in the first intifada was
possible because the division between combatants and non-combatants
was very fluid. During the second intifada, most combatants were male,
so women’s reproductive role as bearers of the fighters, a politicized role
already present in Palestinian political culture, was heightened, and the
mother of the martyr became a potent symbol of resistance (Johnson and
Kuttab 2001). 
Martyrdom is a constructed form of resistance that is ritualized, not
in terms of the gender of those martyred, but in terms of the gender of
those who absorb the grave shock of losing their family members and, at
the same time, reproduce others. Very few scholars have addressed the
issue of martyrdom when analyzing the relationship between gender and
political transformation in societies beset by high levels of violence.
Pitcher (1998) identifies the cultural and psychological processes that
make Palestinian martyrdom possible within the specific context of
Israeli military occupation. Martyrdom elaborates the ritual, narrative,
and symbolic dimensions of a practice that exists within a Palestinian
discourse of sacrifice and of national liberation. One of Pitcher’s inter-
views shows the “ritualized ways” in which young Palestinian women
defend young men:
The shebab [Palestinian activist youth] began to throw stones. Then the
shooting started. One boy was shot dead…. Maha’s fianc[é] picked up the
body and started a funeral procession to the cemetery. The soldiers called
a curfew, but no one paid attention. They moved in on the procession.
Maha told the shebab to flee and tried to slow the encroaching soldiers.
She stopped to confront them. They backed her into a corner. She began
fighting with them hand to hand. They said, “Stop resisting or we’ll
shoot.” “Then shoot me,” she said and made a break to escape them. She
ran ten meters before they fired and Maha fell.
—Maha Hamdi, 19 years old, martyred December 11, 1987, as told by her
brother, September 5, 1991, Nablus City, the West Bank (Pitcher 1998, 27).
Swedenburg (1990) explores the significant role of peasant women as
central figures in Palestine’s expressive culture and historiography. He
explores how the signifier of the peasant woman is used to construct a
unified Palestinian history and how this unifying function works ideolog-
ically to cover significant differences within Palestinian society. Sa’ar
(2006) has particularly studied the discourse on women’s power among
Palestinians inside the 1948 territories, where women are referred to as
qawiyyi (strong), referring to a feminine strength that is preoccupied with
this collective identity as an ongoing moral existence. The struggling
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Palestinian woman is commonly identified as qawiyyi (strong), shuga’a
(courageous), and saboura (patient). Such representation of women
emanates from the national discourse of the Nakba, and this popular
discourse challenges many existing gender roles but has become a strategy
for survival.
Literary Works of al-Ali, Kanafani, and Darwish
In the previous section we deconstructed the rigid dichotomy of public
versus private domains, de-framed domestic responsibilities, and de-
constrained the re-imagining of feminism in the context of Palestinian
national oppression. In this section we attend to how Scott’s (1985, 1990)
hypothesized “hidden transcripts,” the undeclared, essentially individual
forms of resistance, created a culture, a movement, a nation of resistance.
We will integrate the work of a novelist, a poet, and a cartoonist into the
discussion of how Palestinian women created a nation of resistance and
thus feminized resistance. The works of these three popular literary
writers, in fact, mirror the conditions that began with the Nakba and, at
the same time, shaped and constructed a feminized reality of resistance.
These two are in dialectical correlation—that is, they interact and repro-
duce each other simultaneously. 
Naji al-Ali
Naji al-ali (1937–87) was born in al Shajarah, a village near Tiberias that
was destroyed in 1948, and was forced to leave with his family during the
Nakba; they travelled to Ein el-Helweh refugee camp in south Lebanon.
His artistic career began in the late 1950s; he became the most popular
artist in the arab world. He was always a defender of poor, ordinary
people and a critic of oppression and despotism. as a signature to his
famous cartoons he used the very popular and iconic Handala, a symbol
of Palestinian identity and defiance and an image of the Palestinian
struggle. His cartoons are very simple but deliver a sharp critique. They are
understood by the general public and are representative of their plight. 
Women are a dominant presence in Naji al-ali’s cartoons. He always
engaged women in debates and always took a progressive stand, even on
gender issues. al-ali’s women fight for the people’s rights and get back
their pride. Fatima, his main character, is always the conscience of her
husband, who is part of the revolution. She always straightens his path
and is mindful of his words as he begins to withdraw. Most of the
cartoons have historical and political significance. The Palestinian
woman constantly awakens her husband’s mind from becoming defeated
– here the male represents the arab regimes’ defeatist positions 
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Fatima is also the poor Palestinian mother who loses her son in the
resistance, the oppressed, Ein el-Helweh refugee camp in Lebanon, the
southern Lebanese woman, Egypt that refuses Camp David, Beirut that
held the Palestinian fighters, a fighter in the war zones, and, lastly, the
strong pole that survived the departure of Palestinian fighters from
Lebanon in 1982 (el-Fakeeh 2011). She has strong anti-bourgeois views,
debates Security Council Resolution 242, and mourns when the Israeli
flag is raised in Cairo, all with sarcasm laced with some humour. She
plants the seeds of hope, patience, resistance, and life. She is the positive
and the nation’s brain.
Fatima’s role as a homemaker, a mother, a passionate woman who
sacrifices everything for her family, never impedes her from joining the
revolution. Fatima shares her political opinions and refuses to let go of
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FIGURE 1
“Good Morning Beirut” by Naji al-Ali
the key to the home that was taken from her family during the Nakba.
Fatima is the land that was stolen and raped.
The Palestinian woman is central in the conflict; she is the people, the
refugee camp, the intifada, the South, Sour city, Saida city, Sabra refugee
camp (el-Yakoobi 2006). She is the proud mother, the international, the
national, and the humane. She makes bread in the morning, but the fire
beneath it is lit with daily newspapers that she thinks they should put
behind them to move on in the path of freedom. In Figures 1–3 we see
Beirut as a woman to whom a flower is given (Figure 1); pregnant, with a
resistance symbol (keffiyeh) around her neck (Figure 2); and carrying the
injured from the refugee camps to a safe haven (Figure 3). 
Ghassan Kanafani
Ghassan Kanafani (1936–72) was born in akka (acre) and was one of the
most popular and legendary novelists. His stories are performed as plays in
schools and theatres and have been translated into many languages. He is
considered the people’s conscience and the philosopher of the revolution. 
One of Kanafani’s most famous novels is Um Saad (“Mother of
Saad”), published in 1969. Um Saad, the protagonist, narrates the life of
ordinary Palestinian women who do extraordinary things. She is a woman
who struggles to sustain the basic daily needs, socializes her children to
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FIGURE 2
“Palestinian Woman” by Naji al-Ali
join the resistance, and at times acts as the philosopher of the revolution.
In some sense, Um Saad herself  is the Palestinian revolution. 
Kanafani pictures the mother emanating from the interior of the
precious land. With her roots under the earth, the land is always fertile,
and the olive trees do not need to be watered. She suffers everything that
Palestinians suffered in exile and after expulsion. Um Saad’s portrait is
the typography of the geographical territory: historic Palestine. Kanafani
describes her body, its colour, and its fragrance like the fertile land with its
trees and branches. When she is injured, Kanafani describes her wounds
and says that her blood is like “the fragrance of resistance.” She is the
homeland, and the homeland is her. She is a symbol of power, walks with
her head raised, and refuses to kneel because when the mother kneels or
becomes submissive, the whole nation is lost, and if  she is weak, the whole
nation will fall. She is the hope of a scattered nation.
Um Saad, originally a peasant, is in her forties and lives in Burj el-
Barajneh refugee camp, where she has to work cleaning big buildings for
little pay and work in people’s homes so that she can provide for the
family’s basic needs when her husband is unemployed. The misery of
living in the refugee camp and the harsh living do not break her pride but
amplify her patience, stubbornness, and will. 
To maintain the Palestinian race and continuity and increase their
population in the face of genocides and forced migrations, there was a
The Arab World Geographer / Le Géographe du monde arabe  Vol 16, no 2 (2013)
166 Laura Khoury, Seif  Dana and Ghazi-Walid Falah
FIGURE 3
“Noah’s Ark” by Naji al-Ali
need to reproduce. This has become a form of resistance, or what we call
a feminized construction of resistance. Here the role of Palestinian
women is very important, because fertility and reproduction are an
important weapon. Giving birth to fighters who will join the resistance is
a female responsibility by nature. Um Saad raises Saad, her only son, and
after 20 years sends him to join the resistance. On the day he goes off  to
the 1967 war, she says that she wishes she had 10 of Saad who would join
the resistance. Saad crosses the border from Lebanon to historic
Palestine, with much happiness. Saad represents the seed that women
throw on the fertile land, the refugees, and the hope for return.
Place and time have a clear function in the Palestinian novel:
Um Saad embodies a deep sharp feeling as time goes on, the role of time in the
life of this character becomes clear. The novel is a novel of the rising Palestinian
time that Um Saad represents. Here she lives in this spacious new time that
corresponds with new space (the other tent), after she contributed to building
them. The novel expressed this new time and its effect on Um Saad: “like a clock
beat it came. This woman comes always ascending from the core of the land.”
She lives in an ascending time that denotes the popular revolution. This time
refreshed her torn soul, and brought back her appetite to life, lightened the new
generation’s path, and the dream became true (el-Shami 2009).
Um Saad does not believe in any supernatural powers and knows that
only her actions will help her. This point is also clear in Kanafani’s unfin-
ished story “The Blind and the Deaf” (1972). What brought Um Saad to
existence are the conditions of the contradictory refugee status, the resis-
tance that counters defeat. In Kanafani’s other novels, such as Men in the
Sun (1963), we see the double burden on women as homemakers and
labourers. Under colonization, Kanafani illuminates the social and
national oppression of Palestinian women; in letters to Ghada al-
Samman we see his highly progressive view on the status of women. In his
unfinished novel Barkook Nisan (“april’s Plums,” 1972), Kanafani intro-
duces Sua’d from the West Bank, who receives her education in political
science and joins the resistance. She then becomes a leader in the resis-
tance and represents the smart, cautious, and resourceful women.
Mahmoud Darwish
Mahmoud Darwish (1941–2008) was born in the village of Birweh in the
upper Galilee. He is an internationally acclaimed, popular, and progres-
sive poet who shares similar themes with Kanafani and al-ali. 
Womanhood is a grand symbol in Darwish’s work. according to
Masoud (2010), one of the important themes of his work is 
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the motherhood topic and its symbolic reference to home. This celebration of
land and referring to it as a mother was a necessity in Palestine in the twenty
years following the Nakba; it provided an easier connection between social and
national themes. This is demonstrated in one of Mahmoud Darwish’s poem[s, ]
Ila Ommi “To My Mother” [1996] … [This poem] is considered to be a core
pamphlet in the building of the literature of resistance. This is because of the
writer’s ability to connect both the theme of motherhood and nationhood at
times when writing about the latter could lead to imprisonment.
Darwish’s poem “To My Mother” (1996) clearly exhibits the connection
that Masoud (2010) is making:
I yearn for my mother’s bread
My mother’s coffee,
My mother’s touch
and childhood grows inside me
Day upon breast of day
and I love my life because
If I died
I’d feel ashamed because of my mother’s tears
Take me (mother), if  one day I return,
as a veil for your lashes
and cover my bones with grass
Baptised by the purity of your heel
and fasten my bonds
With a lock made of your hair
With a piece of thread that trails in the train of your dress
Maybe I’d become a god
a god I’d become
If I touched the depths of your heart
Put me, if  I return,
as fuel in your cooking stove,
as a clothes line on your rooftop
For I have lost resolve
Without your daily prayer
I have grown decrepit: Give me back the stars of childhood
That I may join
The young birds
On the return route
To the nest of your waiting 
—Mahmoud Darwish, 1996 (trans. Masoud 2010) 
In this and many other poems, Darwish refers to his mother and to
women baking bread, an image that became emblematic of Palestinian
daily culture. He provides a picture of a peasant woman waking up early
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to prepare bread for her children, transforming a chore as part of
domestic labour and constructing it as fundamental to ongoing life. Bread
is like life. The poem continues into stronger images of both motherhood
and “Palestinianism” or “arabism” when the poet talks about the beauty
of the arabic woman who veils her face. 
In his poem “The Land,” Darwish writes: “I am the land … the land
is you…. Khadija! Do not close the door … do not go into coma … we
will expel them from the bottle and the laundry wire … we will expel them
from this path, we will expel them from the Galilee space” (our transla-
tion). Here again the stones and the path represent the resistance. 
abdel Hadi (2009) contends that feminizing poems are found in
ancient arab poetry in discourses with homeland, but modern poetry
describes the homeland in many different ways. However, Darwish used
women and the female narrative of resistance in a number of his works.
For example, she is the homeland: “My homeland is not a baggage, and I
am not leaving, I am in love and the land is my (woman) lover” (our trans-
lation). a woman symbolizes the land and the home: “Your eyes are saved
in my eyes, I adore them and I protect them from the wind” (our transla-
tion). 
Conclusion
In current times, when desires to resist are being conscripted, the rich
history of historic Palestine is being devalued, and significant concepts
(including resistance) have become inferiorized, particular powerful
metaphors like “Palestine as a woman” still preserve themselves as nativist
nostalgia and are maintained to subvert dominant thinking that re-
inscribes colonial relations. Palestinian women preserved the internal
integrity of this nativist nostalgia related to the homeland, collectively
defied liberation, firmly wielded the weapons of the struggle contained in
their culture, spoke a united language of resistance, and unearthed the
colonial cultural matrix by feminizing resistance. 
The Palestinian national narrative since the Nakba, as in the three
literary forms discussed above—novels (Kanafani), cartoons (al-ali), and
poetry (Darwish)—has developed a collective consciousness among
Palestinians in relation to women and resistance. National culture is thus
a social product of any group or any nation. an analysis of the narrative
of terrorism today or since the 1990s would yield a parallel relationship
between resistance and terrorism; the first is legitimate under interna-
tional law, while the second is not, but still they are lumped together. 
as we have elaborated, in the national Palestinian culture Palestinian
women represent the fertile homeland, Palestine, and the honoured resis-
tance. In fact, we argue that there is clearly a feminized construction of
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resistance. Women are like acre, which resisted and defeated Napoleon’s
operation on the Fertile Crescent when it spread from Cairo to al-Sham
(Damascus). Most of the resistance literature in the arab world has circled
around the Palestinian cause, as Palestine is the only territory currently
under occupation. This emphasizes the significance of Palestinian women
even more: Palestine as a woman became the beat and signifier of the arab
Umma, or nation, and its aspirations, as well as its ambitions. The litera-
ture of resistance is equated with that of Latin america (and with poetry
like that of Pablo Neruda); the only difference is in the representation of
women. This is clearly why it is very common to find the metaphor of
raping the land in relation to the Israeli occupation. 
Resistance is not a newcomer to the arab Islamic world. In the 7th
century there appeared four relevant historical forms of resistance: the
Mutazalites (who believed in open opposition), the Shi‘ites (who believed
in empowerment through a secret underground resistance), the Khawarej
(who believed in armed resistance), and the Sufists (who believed in nega-
tive individual opposition by means of silence and mysticism). “There is
a shift in the locus of resistance from external outright military action to
internal control of the will … redefining resistance based on anti-imperial
assumptions of post-colonial societies” (Khoury and Dana 2012, 195).
Cultural resistance symbolism in Palestinian women has significantly
characterized the period since the Nakba. We have argued above that the
feminine construction of resistance was produced by blurring the private
and private domains and by employing domestic labour as a tool for
collective behaviour. The literature on women expresses the hopes of an
occupied nation when the woman is the one to plant seeds; expresses the
pride of a nation when she always walks with her head up; and reflects the
collective consciousness.
The symbolism of Palestine as a woman has constantly been rein-
vented in artistic forms such as the following two paintings. Figure 4 draws
Jerusalem as a woman that has been Judaized; her neck is surrounded with
a high separation wall, while her beautiful facial features are being
defaced, painted over in the blue of the Israeli flag. Her forehead shows
how angry she is, and that tells us she will not let go. Figure 5 is a map of
Palestine as a woman by the artist Ibtisam Barakat, who writes on the map,
“The map of Palestine the way my grandfather envisioned it: The sun rises
in her mouth, spring appears in her eyes, the Mediterranean waves combs
her hair, she wears a boat of Jaffa (Yafa) as her earings, and has a beauty
spot on her face because she is from Damascus.” Calls to refer to Palestine
as “my lady” and graffiti identifying Palestine as a woman are frequent.
There is thus no reversal of the national cultural product; in fact, there is
only constant revival and preservation of the idea of women’s representa-
tion in popular culture throughout the occupation years. 
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Nowhere in this article have we implied that because Western defini-
tions of gender do not fit the Palestinian non-Western colonial context,
Palestinian women do not need to gain equality with men in a patriarchal
society. We also think that marginalized women in refugee camps (as well
as in Gaza) are represented in the literature we studied because of their
high levels of poverty, but the educated middle classes are also repre-
sented in other literary works. We chose the most national popular forms
of literary work that appeared in early 1960s, which contributed to setting
the nativist nostalgia for Palestine as a woman. In 1990, women in refugee
camps in the West Bank were active participants in political mobilization
through their contributions in home economies and reproduction
(Khoury 1990). Palestinian women’s agency resists the realities of the
refugee camps as exile or al-manfa—the margin and the transition zone. 
The phenomenon of “feminizing resistance” came about because
certain undeclared domestic, individual forms of resistance—Scott’s
“hidden transcripts” (Scott 1985, 1990)—created a nation of resistance in
the newly created exile environment, where marginalized Palestinian
women were disconnected from the cultural base of their stolen home-
land and reconfigured a pattern not modelled after Western model gender
politics. These women confronted the rigid dichotomy of public versus
private domains; they de-framed domestic responsibilities; and they de-
constrained their re-imagining of feminism within the context of their
national oppression. 
We believe that the times we are currently experiencing, in which
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FIGURE 4
Caricature of Jerusalem as a woman by Mohammad Sabaaneh
desires are being conscripted, the rich history of historic Palestine is being
devalued, and significant concepts (such as resistance) have become infe-
riorized, particular powerful metaphors, such as Palestine as a woman,
came to be preserved as a nativist nostalgia that has been maintained to
subvert dominant thinking that re-inscribes colonial relations (see
Khoury and Dana 2012). Decolonizing the mind, as Fanon ([1952] 1967)
suggested, or relieving the cultural damage inflicted by the colonizer
requires a collective defiance by the subaltern, rising above the staged
drama before the inferiority of the colonized is epidermalized, as well as
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FIGURE 5
“Map of Historic Palestine” by Ibtisam Barakat
foregrounding the accountability of Palestinian symbols by means of
feminizing resistance. The struggle today is over “representation that
occurs in language, writing, and other forms of cultural production”
(ashcroft 2001, 2). Palestinian women seized their self-representation by
opposing the language of oppression, asserted the language that
appeared in the indigenous narrative, and revived the culture of resistance
and regained its meaning as part of everyday life. 
Representations of women as symbols of Palestine, Beirut, and the
resistance by three renowned writers also reflect the status of Palestinian
women after the Nakba and helped to shape and constitute women as
subjects. Gender in the context of conflict and war allowed Palestinian
women to weave their “domestic labour” into resistance practice in
everyday life, thereby feminizing resistance. Thus they created a move-
ment, culture and a nation of resistance. This cultural resistance defies the
spirit of the colonial mentality and accentuate colonial political regimes
of truth. Palestinian women managed to unearth the colonizer’s cultural
matrix and, by feminizing resistance and reviving the native nostalgia of
viewing Palestine as a beautiful pure woman, constituted a self-conscious
voice of dissent. They are reviving the language of resistance, preserving
the internal integrity of indigenous culture, and practising cultural resis-
tance par excellence.
Notes
1. Many studies of nationalism and gender were published in the late 1990s and
early 2000s (Hasso 1998; abdulhadi 1998; Gluck 1995; Benhabib 2002;
amireh 2003; Tami 1999). Yuval-Davis (1997) discusses how the gendered
national narrative is concerned with constructing and disciplining the bodies
of women and identifies the ways in which women are implicated in
nationalist objectives (biological, cultural, and symbolic).
2. Events in Palestine began with the 1948 occupation, or Nakba, and
continued with the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) in 1965, the 1967 war or el-Naksa, Black September 1970 in Jordan,
the 1973 war, the 1975 Lebanese war, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982
and the departure of the Palestinian resistance from Lebanon, the national
guidance committee in 1982, the first Intifada in 1987, the Oslo accords in
1993, the advent of the Palestinian authority in 1995, Hamas winning the
election of 2006, the al-aqsa Intifada in 2000, the Jenin Refugee Camp
massacre in 2002, the victory of Hezbollah in 2006, and the war and geno-
cides in Gaza in 2008–9.
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Geopolitical Representations: A Textual Analysis
of the Turkish Film VALLEY OF THE
WOLVES—PALESTINE
Necati anaz
Department of International Relations, Necmettin Erbakan University,
Konya, Turkey
This article focuses primarily on geopolitical representations in the Turkish film
Valley of the Wolves—Palestine and on the film’s cinematizing of Israel’s military
actions against Palestinians. Through textual readings of the film, the author high-
lights three main discussion points by conducting textual readings of the film: (1)
reading the film as a counter-geopolitical text that challenges the definition of what
are known to be Palestinian and Israeli territories; (2) reading the film as a cine-
matic text that (re)negotiates Jewish identity and who can be categorized as
“good” or “bad” Jews; and (3) reading the film as a political document that
attempts to reverse “territorial truth” attached to the imaginative geography of the
Promised Land. Reading of selected conversations and action scenes constitutes an
important element of the author’s analysis of the film. 
Keywords: Valley of the Wolves—Palestine, counter-geopolitics, geopolitical repre-
sentations, imaginative geographies, territorial truth 
Cet article analyse principalement les représentations géopolitiques dans le film
turc La vallée des loups – Palestine ainsi que la mise en scène cinématographique
des opérations militaires israéliennes menées contre des Palestiniens. À travers une
lecture textuelle du film, l’auteur souligne trois éléments de discussion : une lecture
textuelle du film comme un texte contre-géopolitique qui conteste les définitions
habituelles de ce que l’on considère être les territoires palestiniens et israéliens;
ensuite une lecture cinématique du film comme un texte qui renégocie l’identité
juive et les catégories des « bons » et des « mauvais » juifs ; enfin, la lecture du film
comme un document politique qui tente de retourner la « vérité territoriale » atta-
chée à la géographie imaginée de la Terre promise. L’analyse d’un choix de conver-
sations et de scènes d’action constitue un élément important de l’analyse du film
par l’auteur.
Mots-clés : La vallées des loups -—Palestine, contre-géopolitique, representations
géopolitiques, géographies imaginatives, vérité territoriale 
ISRaELI SOLDIER: Why did you come to Israel?
POLaT: I did not come to Israel. I came to Palestine.1
—Valley of the Wolves—Palestine
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Introduction
Films form an everyday image-based language that can provide better
ways of framing a radically changing geopolitical world compared to
other forms of geopolitical text such as state-sponsored political docu-
ments, speeches, and media outlets (Power and Crampton 2007). Even the
most complicated and problematic issues of socio-political life can be
expressed smoothly through cinematic narrations and artistic forms; the
indisputable ability of films to present events and social subjects in a
compelling, and even propagandist, manner charms politicians and world
states. Films (and cinema in general), for that reason, have been and
continue to be the concern of states, non-state actors, and policy makers.
Moreover, by entertaining audiences, they naturally become a mediatic
instrument of information for millions. This self-assigned task can often
be put to work by a state-aligned entertainment sector to help to create a
language parallel to the state’s geopolitical visions while securing
economic gain. a prime example of such cinematic text is a Turkish polit-
ical action film, Valley of the Wolves—Palestine (VWP), which under-
takes the dual task of entertaining millions and of informing audiences
about Turkey’s geopolitical visions in the Middle East as it challenges
Israel’s military practices in Palestine. 
In its own way, VWP can certainly be situated as a geopolitical text
that not only challenges widely understood geopolitical narratives about
the Middle East but also conveys and rationalizes Turkey’s geopolitical
aspirations in the region; in this article, however, I focus mainly on the
film’s several geopolitical representations. The film, which cinematizes
Israel’s military actions against Palestine, becomes the main focus of my
analysis in three ways: (1) reading the film as a counter-geopolitical text
that challenges the definition of what are known to be Palestinian and
Israeli territories; (2) reading the film as a cinematic text that (re)negoti-
ates Jewish identity and who can be categorized as “good” or “bad” Jews;
and (3) reading the film as a political document that attempts to reverse
the “territorial truth” attached to the imaginative geography of the
Promised Land. Therefore, selected conversations and readings of action
scenes constitute an important element of my analysis of VWP. Of
course, many other readings are possible.
Film and Geopolitical Representations
Scholars from various disciplines—such as geography, international area
studies, communication, and cultural studies—consider the capacity of
popular productions to shape the opinions of millions of people and the
way they understand the world (Sharp 1996; Dodds 2006; Power and
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Crampton 2007; Dittmer 2010). Scholars in geopolitics concentrate on
popular culture’s potential to influence identity construction and the
geographic imaginations of the masses. Further, they pay special atten-
tion to popular culture’s ability, whether in films, political cartoons,
magazines, books, or other media, to abridge the complexity of social
interactions and simplify the disorderliness of world politics into a binary
form such as “us against them” or “good versus evil.” Popular geopolitics
writers argue that popular culture creates abstract and material environ-
ments within which familiar social, cultural, and geopolitical meanings
shape and are shaped by millions of people who may have never met
(Williams 2007; Dittmer and Dodds 2008). Hollywood filmmaking, for
example, almost always actively engages in making cultural and
geographical representations of the West, and those films that do not
represent the West are produced with an Orientalist mindset (Said 1978).
In Hollywood films, american values such as individualism, the sanctity
of family, love of democracy, fighting for a right cause, and the love of
hard work are constantly re-produced and displayed for the interest of the
world as the values of other nations are made secondary and “other”
(Toal 2007). Especially during the Cold War and after 9/11, Hollywood’s
involvement in projecting one-sided political, cultural, moral, and
geographical views for audiences was celebrated more than in other
historical periods (Dittmer 2010). Films such as Rambo (1985), Top Gun
(1986), Saving Private Ryan (1998), Black Hawk Down (2001), and Behind
Enemy Lines (2001) successfully brought to consciousness for millions
american exceptionalism and its geopolitical responsibilities, parallelling
the conjectural policies of current administrations (Toal 2003; Dittmer
2010). Through Hollywood films, america’s geopolitical visions and
imaginations are effectively and repeatedly coded, presented with little or
no emphasis on alternative mappings. VWP, produced outside of that
Western world, presents itself  as one cinematic representation that
contests the very fundamentals of geopolitical understandings and
geographic projections of the Middle East. From this perspective, the film
not only re-visions Turkish geopolitics within the system of contempo-
rary world politics but also renegotiates dominant understandings of
territoriality and the cultural politics of a “Promised Land” through its
cinematic language and form. 
Valley of the Wolves—Palestine
The political action film, Valley of the Wolves—Palestine (VWP) was
released in Turkey and abroad by Pana Film Company in January 2011.2
Following several popular television series—Valley of the Wolves (Kurtlar
Vadisi) (2003–2005), Valley of the Wolves—Terror (2007), and Valley of
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the Wolves—Ambush (2007–)—the political action films Valley of the
Wolves—Iraq (2006), Valley of the Wolves—Gladio (2009), and now Valley
of the Wolves—Palestine (2011) have become part of a collection of James
Bond–type cinema serials. Pana Film owes its success to the TV series
Valley of the Wolves, which began broadcasting in January 2003 and has
continued under different titles and on different nationwide TV channels
(see Table 1). 
TABLE 1
Valley of the Wolves films and TV series 
TV Series Year Films Year
Valley of the Wolves 2003–5 Valley of the Wolves—Iraq 2006
Valley of the Wolves—Terror 2007 Valley of the Wolves—Gladio 2009
Valley of the Wolves—Ambush 2007– Valley of the Wolves—Palestine 2011
The TV series (Valley of the Wolves) and the films familiarized audi-
ences with many values such as honour, duty, bravery, and love of country
before any other concepts or messages (Yanık 2009). They similarly dealt
with and engaged in domestic and international conspiracy theories and
heroic sacrifice, heavily ornamented with nationalism, traditionalism,
and justified killing (Iık 2006; Demir 2007; Yanık 2009; anaz and Purcell
2010). The producers of Valley of the Wolves set their storylines in the
day-to-day concerns of Turkish life, such as fighting against the dark
organization of the “deep state,” corrupt financial entities, and external
enemies’ designs on Turkey and the region (Gültekin 2006). Valley of the
Wolves—Iraq (VWI), for example, brought the Iraq war into cinematic
reality by basing its narration on a series of events that allegedly took
place in afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 through 2006. 
although Pana Film considered making another film similar to VWI
immediately after its release in 2006, the idea failed to take shape until the
Israel–Palestine conflict became a critical issue for the ruling party, the
Justice and Development Party (aKP). When aKP leader Recep Tayyip
Erdo an had an acrid conversation with Israeli President Shimon Peres at
the 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos, the idea was reconsidered.
after Turkey experienced the “height of humiliation” during a diplomatic
meeting between the Turkish ambassador, ahmet O uz Çelikkol, and
Israel’s deputy foreign minister, Danny ayalon, in Jerusalem in January
2010 (BBC 2010), VWP began to take shape. The subsequent attack by
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on the Mavi Marmara Gaza Flotilla in
May 2010, which resulted in nine deaths and the wounding of 50 Turkish
citizens in international waters, gave the needed momentum for this polit-
ical action film to be realized. The plot of VWP, like that of VWI, follows
well-trained Turkish agents, led by protagonist Polat alemdar, on a quest
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for revenge against the cruel Israeli general Moshe Ben Eliezer, the prime
planner and executor of the Mavi Marmara raid. The film begins with the
IDF’s operation aboard the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish ship sailing to
break the Israeli blockade of Gaza and transport a humanitarian cargo
to Palestinians. From the beginning and throughout the film, many shoot-
ings and killings occur during Israeli soldiers’ raids on Palestinian neigh-
bourhoods and when Polat and his men engage with Israeli soldiers. The
film does not refrain even for a moment from depicting IDF soldiers as
ultimate killing machines attacking innocent Palestinian civilians. 
Valley of the Wolves—Palestine and Territorial Correction
at the beginning of the film, Polat alemdar contests the idea of the terri-
toriality of the State of Israel and notions of belonging and non-
belonging in Jerusalem. 
For his audiences and the apparatus of the Jewish state, Polat reaf-
firms where Israeli home and homeland begins and ends, through his
conversations throughout the film. When the soldier in charge of border
control asks Polat what brings him to Israel, he answers by correcting the
question: “I did not come to Israel—I came to Palestine” (see Figure 1).
With this statement, Polat verifies that Palestine does not belong to Israel
and draws our attention to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. In
this way Polat engages in territorial correction and geopolitical remap-
ping of Palestinian geography, unequivocally and directly telling the audi-
ences who is the occupier and who is the occupied. Polat’s verifications of
the geography of occupation echo a statement about Palestinian territo-
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ries by the Turkish president during a talk at Columbia University in New
York. In answer to a student’s question comparing Turkey’s Kurdish
population and Palestine, President abdullah Gül stated,
These two are different. Kurds are the citizens of Turkey. We have been living
together for hundreds of years. There are Kurdish people in the Turkish cabinet.
We are the equal citizens of the Republic of Turkey. But, Israelis and
Palestinians do not come from the same nation. They are not the parts of the
same nation. Gaza does not belong to Israel. Palestinian territories do not
belong to Israel. The struggle in Turkey and the struggle in the Middle East are
not the same (Yeinsu 2010, 17).
as I read this scene, Polat reaffirms the president’s geopolitical presentment as
well as engaging in the meaning-making of territorial correction. Short,
bold, precise conversations throughout VWP continually convey impor-
tant messages for the audience, confirming a rhetoric that is vibrant in
the minds of millions in the Middle East. For example, dinner conversa-
tions in the home of the Palestinian character abdullah reveal impor-
tant messages about the Palestinian struggle to rebuild their territories
and homes:
aBDULLaH: God willing, I am going to build the second floor in a few
months. 
HIS WIFE: We built this place six times and Israelis demolished it six times
and he is still talking about building the second floor. They will demolish it
again.
MEMaTI [Polat’s man]: Brother! You studied engineering, established a busi-
ness and made enough money in Lebanon. Why did you still want to come
back here [Palestine]? 
aBDULLaH: Brother! If  I leave, he leaves, and they leave, then who is going
to stay here? This is our home, homeland. 
MEMaTI: Some will fight while some earn money to support the fighters.
aBDULLaH: I want to spend my money in my homeland. Freely!
POLaT: abdullah, if  you know that they are going to demolish your home,
why do you insist on building it again? 
aBDULLaH’S MOTHER: If  you give up resisting once, the Israelis will never
let any one of us live here again. 
It should be noted that VWP is deeply concerned with informing
viewers that ongoing resistance is the only way to survive in Palestine and
to retain Palestinian homeland and territories. Therefore, territoriality,
which deals with human activities exercised on space and activities of
controlling, defending, excluding, or/and including the demarcated area
(Cox 2002), becomes the main concern of the VWP. Thus the film not
only participates in the defence of Palestinian resistance but also high-
lights (and frames) discourses that justify why Palestinians belong to the
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land and are entitled to control their home and homeland. VWP thus acts
as a cinematic document conferring the rights and privileges of
Palestinians to their land. 
Territoriality is an active, contested, practised, and socially
constructed process; it is practised every day and everywhere. Thus terri-
toriality is as much about control over/of territory as it is about defini-
tions, identifications, and demarcations. In this sense, VWP also contests
and redefines territorial definitions—such as danger, fear, street, home,
and jurisdiction—that are associated with everyday life for Palestinians.
This becomes evident in the film when alternative representations of
Palestinian territories become as important as controlling those territo-
ries. For example, conversations between abdullah’s disabled son,
ahmed, and Simone, a Jewish-american tour guide, show audiences what
it means to be a Palestinian in Jerusalem and what it means to be a child
in the streets of Palestine. These conversations highlight how fear and
danger are intertwined in the definition of everyday place and space in
Palestine. (These conversations take place in abdullah’s home, where
Polat, his men, and Simone take shelter after a fight at a checkpoint.)
SIMONE: I have to go. I will need to go to my consulate [United States] to
report what happened today. 
POLaT: They are looking for you, too. 
SIMONE: Don’t worry! I will explain to everyone that you guys are innocent. 
POLaT: Outside is dangerous.
SIMONE [to Abdullah’s family]: Thanks for the hospitality.
aHMED: Don’t go outside. They will shoot you. 
SIMONE: Why would they shoot me?
aHMED: They shot me. 
SIMONE: Why?
GRaNDMOTHER: They shot him when he was coming back from his school.
They said there was a curfew. They shot whoever was on the street. 
SIMONE: [After pausing for a moment] I am really sorry. This violence and
cruelty has nothing to do with us. a real Jew does not do this.
Simone leaves the house. The camera follows her closely as she moves
nervously through the dark streets of Jerusalem, until gunfire and the
screams of Palestinians are heard from the corner at the other end of the
street. Everyone runs for their lives. Moshe’s men are shooting randomly
and trying to maintain order; Palestinian security forces move in to stop
them:
PaLESTINIaN POLICE: What are you doing here?
MOSHE’S DEPUTY: There are terrorists here. We are here to arrest them.
PaLESTINIaN POLICE: This is Palestinian territory, you have no jurisdic-
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tion. Take your men out of here immediately. 
MOSHE’s DEPUTY: We enter any neighbourhood we want. 
(Moshe arrives)
PaLESTINIaN POLICE: This is our territory! You and your soldiers get out
of here.
MOSHE: I decide; when, where becomes whose territory. 
Moshe reaffirms that he is the law and the Israeli army has jurisdic-
tion to cross any boundary. He kills Palestinian security officers and
continues his search for Polat and his men. On the way, he kills more and
more Palestinians. 
In the following excerpt, VWP again engages in territorial correction,
demarcating for the audience where Palestinian land begins and ends.
Memati, one of Polat’s men, has the following conversation with
abdullah as they plan their operation over the map of Palestine and Israel
(see Figure 3): 
MEMaTI: Brother! Tell me, now, where is Palestine and where is Israel?
aBDULLaH: [pointing the map on the table] Here is Palestine, and there is
Israel. 
MEMaTI: Sure, brother! But isn’t this Palestine an autonomous state? What
are Israelis doing here?
aBDULLaH: They only gave the name, not the land. 
Here VWP reassures viewers that Palestine must exist on the ground,
because it certainly exists on the map. By so doing, it takes audiences into
the politics of world cartography and suggests that Palestine, too, is an
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FIGURE 2
Simone looks around nervously, scanning the streets.
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actual and objective terrain: it can be mapped, and maps are popularly
understood as objectively mirroring reality. The scene also reaffirms for
viewers that the Palestinian cause is a struggle for survival and human
rights, since the land and its people land exist on the map as well as on the
ground. What VWP attempts to do here is to place Palestinians in their
homeland by underlining the absolute locations of a Palestinian state and
its people on the ground. By giving the geographic coordinates of a
Palestinian state on the map, the film establishes a cartographic discourse
in which Palestine and its people become unquestionable, scientific, and
the natural elements of cartography. 
Through the moving eye of the camera, the film continues to repro-
duce Palestinian territories. The camera slowly moves around the corners
of abdullah’s home. First, it captures children playing, sending a message
that these children are future Palestinians and cannot be erased from the
Palestinian map. Then it pans through the other corner of the room,
capturing photographs of abdullah’s past and the framed deed to the
family’s property (see Figure 4). In these frames, the film confirms the
concreteness of the Palestinian past, the continuation of the present, and
the certainty of the Palestinian future. In other words, deliberate motions
of the camera in abdullah’s home tell us that abdullah’s past cannot be
separated from Palestine’s present, nor Palestine’s present from abdulla’s
past. By gazing through the al-aqsa Mosque in the background of the
blurred property deed above the photo of abdullah’s family, viewers can
understand that this film suggests that we reject the idea of a country
without a people, which would make the land empty and available for new
settlements. Through the images captured by the camera, the filmmakers
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FIGURE 3
Abdullah points to the map of Palestine
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reaffirm that Palestine is not “a land without people for a people without
a land” (Said 1992, 9). 
Similarly, the key holder shown in Figure 5 remains one of the most
important objects captured by the camera in abdullah’s home. The words
on the key holder, which is carved in the shape of a key, read “I love you,
Palestine.” The key shape symbolizes the story of Palestinians’ lost homes
under the occupation and communicates to the audience that this story is
still alive, with the hope that someday Palestinians will go back to their
homes. The image of the al-aqsa Mosque on the handle shows that
Jerusalem, where the mosque is located, is a place to which every
Palestinian possesses the key and thus has a right to enter, regardless of
their distance. On the other side of the key is the figure of a child,
Handala, who shows his back to us and who belongs to a famous exiled
Palestinian cartoonist, Naji al-ali. This figure is now the official logo of
the Commission for Freedom and Justice through Humor (Najialali.com
2007). In al-ali’s words, this child “is barefoot like many children in
refugee camps … an icon … and his hands behind his back are a symbol
of rejection of all the present negative tides in our region” (najialali.com
2007, 7). The camera does not capture these images (children playing,
framed items on the wall, the key holder) at random. Together with other
frames, these images establish a framework in which the state of belonging
and ownership of the land are reproduced. The message is that every
Palestinian has the right to live in and fight for their home/land.
In another scene, VWP highlights Palestinians’ emotional attach-
ment and visceral connection to their land when Moshe orders abdullah’s
home to be demolished on top of his son ahmed (see Figure 6). as their
FIGURE 4
The camera captures selected figures hung on the wall of Abdullah’s home.
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home is being demolished with ahmed inside, his grandmother pushes
through the guards and crawls toward the rubbles, helplessly crying out,
“ahmed! My ahmed! God is with you. You sleep in peace. Don’t worry!
Where you lie is the Palestinian soil.”
VWP continually accentuates this geopolitical discourse: that the fight
in Palestine is not only over history (Promised Land) but also over geog-
raphy (Homeland). The film continuously presents the Palestinian land
with memories, attachments, and stories, supporting the struggle against
the project of de-arabizing and Judaizing the Palestinian Territories. 
Valley of the Wolves—Palestine and “Good” and “Bad” Jew
However, VWP makes one thing very clear to its audience. according to
the filmmakers, there are “bad” Israelis like Moshe (military personnel,
corrupt and cruel), and there are “good” Jews like Simone (the Jewish-
american tour guide). Without depicting Israel as a place of torture and
illegality in sweeping generalizations, the film parallels the genre politics
of action/thriller films by representing Israel as a state hijacked by reli-
gious fanatics, with Zionist colonialists striving to establish a greater
Jewish state that leaves no space for non-Jews. VWP makes clear that
there are Jewish people who believe in universal human rights,
Palestinians’ rights to exist, and the coexistence of Jews and Palestinians
in Israel. a Jewish-american, Simone, portrays this exceptional figure,
while Moshe is classified as one who shows no respect for or tolerance of
non-Jews living in Israel. (These conversations take place before ahmed
is killed by Moshe.)
FIGURE 5
The Arabic script reads, “I love you, Palestine.”
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aHMED: Grandma! Simone is scared. 
GRaNDMOTHER: Why is she scared?
aHMED: Because she is Jewish. She thinks that she will be killed here [in East
Jerusalem] because of [her Jewish identity]. 
GRaNDMOTHER: Those who torture us are our enemies, not the Jewish
people. No one will or can touch her here.
The certainty and fortitude in Grandmother’s voice make Simone put
her head down, indicating that she is ashamed to be Jewish or, at least,
ashamed of how the Jewish state treats Palestinians. VWP makes the
point that Israel is the one that ignores the human side of Palestinian
geography and history. Indeed, throughout the film, there is no single
conversation or scene that implies that Palestinians deny the geographical
and historical existence of Israel. This highlights that Israel is as legiti-
mate a state as Palestine is in the region. The film repeatedly makes the
point that this land belongs to all occupants, including Palestinians,
Israelis, and others; but it often highlights that the idea of a “promised
land” is a false ideal and an obstacle to permanent peace in the region. To
enforce this geopolitical statement, WVP uses the knowledge and wisdom
of the Sheikh (the spiritual leader of a Tariqah):
SHEIKH: I have been thinking for a long time about why these people [Israelis]
are torturing Palestinians. I have realized that their fear has forestalled their
rationality and conscience. They have gotten in a condition wherein they
count all non-Jews as the enemy of Jewish people. Islam is a religion of
peace. On the land where we live today, the Jews, Christians and Muslims
have all lived in harmony for centuries. 
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FIGURE 6
A bulldozer demolishes Abdullah’s home with his disabled son, Ahmed, inside.
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VWP continues to question Jewish identity. Parallel to the binary
thinking through which peoples, places, and cultures are identified oppo-
site of each other, this film reproduces Jewishness in two forms: a good
Jew and a bad Jew. Thus, the ideal Jerusalem should resemble that of
Saladin’s time, when Christians, Muslims, and Jews lived in harmony
under the reign of an Islamic Kingdom. The film frames the bad Jews as
those who immigrated from Europe and elsewhere to establish the
Greater Israeli Kingdom, which ideally stretches from the Mesopotamian
Valley to the Sinai Desert, at the expense of other nations and peoples and
at any cost. and what makes these bad Jews bad is that they exclude
everyone except those who believe that the world will fall under the rule of
this new Great Israel, as described in the Bible. Dialogues between
Simone and Moshe reveal this detail. 
SIMONE: I witnessed all the crimes that you committed. You will explain them
in court. I am going to watch you as long as I live. You must know that half
of my family are lawyers. 
MOSHE: Your parents should be ashamed that they have a daughter like you. 
SIMONE: You embarrass all Jewish people. The Torah says “do not kill.” 
MOSHE: Wrong! It says “do not kill Jews.” 
SIMONE: I don’t want to discuss Judaism with you. You are not a Jew. 
MOSHE: You are an idiot who doesn’t know how this country is established. You
don’t deserve to live, but you are a registered Jew, so one Jew is one Jew. [To
guards] Take her away so that she can learn Jewishness. 
With this sort of dialogues, VWP intends to uncover the presumed
characteristics of current Israeli sentiments and some of the main inten-
tions that are hidden from people through the use of a Jewish american
citizen, Simone Levy. The film repeatedly makes this Jewish-american
person speak as an insider/outsider who is able to witness the story from
both sides. Through her conversations, VWP attempts to redefine the
“State of Israel,” which can be understood as a political unit and a demo-
cratic country in which all citizens are equal, as opposed to the “Jewish
state,” which refers to a certain ethnicity and religion. Thus, Simone’s job
as an insider/Jew is to convince viewers that not all Israelis are like Moshe.
But she is not very successful in completing her task:
SIMONE: Mister administrator, you cannot hold me here [in prison]. I am an
american citizen. Please let my embassy come and get me out of here. If  I am
going to be tried, I want to be tried in my country. 
aDMINISTRaTOR: This is your country. Your last name is Levy. Don’t you
know what this noble name means?
SIMONE: I am not going to learn the history of my parents from you. If  you
know my last name, then you should know who I am, too. 
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aDMINISTRaTOR: I know who your parents are very well. [Pointing to a
book] Open to page 216. There, it is written what your grandfather went
through in Poland, and it tells in what conditions he sent your father and
mother to the United States. 
SIMONE: My grandfather did not die so that you could kill people easily here.
My grandfather was killed by murderers like you. Have you found any single
Jew who was killed by an arab in Poland? 
aDMINISTRaTOR: It was never easy to find a home for homeless Jews. arabs
don’t want us here; here on our soil—the Promised Land. 
SIMONE: It is a lie. Yes, before no one was recognizing Israel, but now everyone
recognizes Israel. Those who live here are suffering only because of your
actions.
aDMINISTRaTOR: and they will suffer more. Even rats learn where to go and
where not to go by suffering. Only animals learn by suffering. 
The lines between the good and the bad are clearly drawn in the
dialogue of this film. Conversations also do not last long; they are short,
precise, simple, and memorable for the purpose of delivering their
message to audiences. 
Valley of the Wolves—Palestine and Territorial Truth
VWP not only makes territorial corrections and redefines Jewish identity
but also (re)negotiates and challenges the concept of “territorial truth,”
which tends to operate within the realm of imagined geographies of the
Promised Land. as Quiquivix and Curti (2011) point out, Israel repeat-
edly engages in methods of producing “territorial truth” by applying
imagined geographies of Israel to establish territorial legitimacy, formu-
lated within the rhetoric of the “Promised Land.” In this sense, the
Promised Land corresponds not only to the given geographic locations,
which stretch beyond the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan Valley, but
also accentuates the divine pledging of the land to the descendants of
Jacob. Imagined geographies are by no means fictional or fabricated; as
Said (1978) highlights, they are never the products of purely cognitive
operations. Rather, they are concrete, substantial, and, indeed, real (al-
Mahfedi 2011). For al-Mahfedi (2011, 22), imaginative geography is in
effect as “a precondition for the politics of territorial conquest.” along
the same lines and referencing Nadia abu El-Haj, Quiquivix and Curti
(2011, 42) note Israel’s “obsession with uncovering Jewish archeological
artifacts as a practice through which national identity—and national
rights—have long been asserted.” Citing Meron Benvenisti’s study of
early Zionist cartography, and its production of “white patches” on the
mental maps of Jewish immigrants in Palestine, Quiquivix and Curti
argue that Israel often engages the politics of place-making by registering
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material and imagined productions over occupied Palestinian territories.
In al-Mahfedi’s words, “such conquests of territory begin with the prac-
tice of inventing new meanings about territory and re-imagining systems
of sovereignty on the landscape” (2011, 23). Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu, for example, similarly alluded to re-imagining
systems of sovereignty on the landscape during his speech at the United
Nations in 2011. His speech reaffirmed the Jewishness of the Israeli state
and its people’s right to exist, right to control, and right to dispose of the
holy land, accentuating ancientness of Jewish aspiration to and registra-
tion over the Promised Land:
In my office in Jerusalem, there’s an ancient seal. It’s a signet ring of a Jewish
official from the time of the Bible. The seal was found right next to the Western
Wall, and it dates back 2,700 years, to the time of King Hezekiah. Now, there’s a
name of the Jewish official inscribed on the ring in Hebrew. His name was
Netanyahu. That’s my last name. My first name, Benjamin, dates back a thou-
sand years earlier to Benjamin—Binyamin—the son of Jacob, who was also
known as Israel. Jacob and his 12 sons roamed these same hills of Judea and
Samaria 4,000 years ago, and there’s been a continuous Jewish presence in the
land ever since. 
and for those Jews who were exiled from our land, they never stopped
dreaming of coming back: Jews in Spain, on the eve of their expulsion; Jews in
the Ukraine, fleeing the pogroms; Jews fighting the Warsaw Ghetto, as the Nazis
were circling around it. They never stopped praying, they never stopped
yearning. They whispered: Next year in Jerusalem. Next year in the promised
land.
as the prime minister of Israel, I speak for a hundred generations of Jews
who were dispersed throughout the lands, who suffered every evil under the Sun,
but who never gave up hope of restoring their national life in the one and only
Jewish state (Netanyahu 2011).
Netanyahu’s words surely confirm again the authenticity of the terri-
torial claim and the concreteness of the imagined geography of the
Promised Land, which helps to legitimize the idea of “territorial truth.”
His talk also indicates that Israeli authorities and geographers not only
engage in the politics of place-making (rewriting geography) in Palestine
but also treat Palestinian land as empty land that has been awaiting Israeli
occupation and ownership for centuries. Unless this Promised Land is
fully Judaized, it will stay orphaned and unprotected. as Said (2007)
notes, this narrative is a struggle over Palestinian (in)visibility—or, in the
words of Dabashi (2007, 10), “at the core of the Palestinian historical
presence is … a geographical absence.” Here VWP questions the
Jewishness of the land and contests the idea of Jewish registration of
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Palestinian land as the Promised Land by articulating a new form of
narrative and territoriality. It questions the legitimacy of the idea of occu-
pied land and the neutrality of Jewish settlements in the Palestinian
Territories. For example, when Polat alemdar is reminded that he could
not make it out of the Promised Land, he replies: “I don’t know what part
of this land has been promised to you, but I promise you six feet under.”
Similarly, VWP frequently states that Israeli-occupied land is a contested
and unregistered place in the eyes of international community and under-
lines the politics of dispossession. Therefore, this film can be read as a
cinematic attempt to remake and (re)document where the Palestinian and
Israeli people belong. In other words, VWP is a geopolitical manifesto to
reshape what is popularly known as Palestinian and Israeli home-land. as
both Campbell (2003) and Yanık (2009) argue, this film successfully
reproduces material and imaginative representations of border, threat,
and danger. In this framework, VWP, as a private-sector cultural and
commercial enterprise, reconstructs symbolic representations of the
Palestinian borders and commits to deciphering Israeli geopolitics by
making territorial truth. It contests the very idea of the completeness of
the State of Israel and its rhetoric of the Promised Land, and thus it chal-
lenges popular geopolitical imaginations of Palestine–Israel borders and
underlines the arbitrariness of the Promised Land and of Israel’s
geographical registrations over the Palestinian homeland. To borrow the
words of Massad (2007), the filmmakers have succeeded, in part, in
deploying and instrumentalizing VWP as a weapon of resistance in the
international arena and slowly infiltrating this bastion of Zionist power.
Concluding Remarks
as Yanık (2009) highlights, the controversy about VWP is long over, but
its imprints on Turkish cinema and popular culture make it worth writing
about. To date, not many Turkish popular cinema and television produc-
tions outside the Valley of the Wolves franchise have overtly emphasized
geopolitical topics or heavily adopted nationalist elements in their narra-
tives. Few other Turkish films have used popular culture to set geopolit-
ical agendas that problematize the regional geopolitical order in the
Middle East, and not many other political action films produced in
Turkey have adopted regional geopolitics into their stories successfully to
simplify geopolitical understandings of the Middle East for their audi-
ences. In this sense, VWP is one of the most interesting pieces of popular
culture used both as an entertainment apparatus and as a political docu-
ment that re-registers Palestinian land to Palestinians. But this is not all it
aims to accomplish. as a political action film, VWP also helps “Turks
envision themselves, their country’s and other countries’ place in the new
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global (dis)order” (Yanık 2009, 167), a dimension that should be explored
in further studies. In this study, I have tried to provide a reading of the
geopolitical meanings and representations squeezed between the lines of
conversations and between the frames of filmic action in VWP.
Note
1. all English translations of film dialogue are my own.
2. according to the Internet Movie Database (http://www.imdb.com), the film
was also released in the United States, England, Italy, Iran, France, Germany,
australia, austria, azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
China, Denmark, armenia, South Korea, Croatia, Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, Canada, Cyprus (Greek), Cyprus (Turkish),
Hungary, Macedonia, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, and
Greece. 
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Historians have begun to abandon the nation-state frame of reference and to recog-
nize the significance of borderlands and border crossing for electoral politics;
master narratives such as self and other, domestic and foreign, nationalist and
internationalist, have been redirected to new forms of transnational identity. The
present article follows this lead by asserting that border crossings between Iran and
Iraq were never simply the sum total of transits by heads of state; indeed, such
journeys framed political possibilities within Iraq. During the summer of 1953, the
Zahedi coup in Tehran initiated a series of strikes over the border that challenged
the newly crowned Hashemite King Faisal II in Iraq, as well as his administration’s
vision of a petroleum-based modernity for the country’s working classes. To
advance this position, the author identifies and explicates three different forms of
border-crossing: the cross-border transits of heads of state are contrasted with
those of conscripted soldiers, elderly pilgrims, and middle-class families and the
domestic workers they employed. It becomes clear that the Iraqi left’s political
imaginary also enjoyed a solid base in the neighbouring jurisdiction.
Keywords: coup, domestic workers, labour, migration, pilgrimages, strike, Iraq,
Iran 
Les historiens ont commencé à se détourner du cadre de référence de l’État-nation
pour reconnaitre l’importance des espaces frontaliers et de leur traversée pour la
vie politique électorale. Des grands récits sur le Soi et de l’Autre, le domestique et
l’étranger, le nationaliste et l’internationaliste, ont été instrumentalisés pour définir
de nouvelles formes d’identité transnationale. Cet article affirme que la question de
la traversée de la frontière entre l’Irak et l’Iran ne se réduit pas à une simple comp-
tabilité des mouvements effectués par les chefs d’État, bien qu´ils influençaient les
opportunités politiques en Irak. Durant l’été de 1953, le coup d’État de Zahedi à
Téhéran a incité des Irakiens à lancer des grèves contre le roi hachémite Fayçal II
et contre la vision que son gouvernement propageait d´une modernité basée sur le
pétrole. L’auteur identifie et analyse trois formes de traversée de la frontière : le
passage des chefs d’État est comparé à celui des conscrits, des pèlerins d´un certain
âge, des familles des classes moyennes et de leurs employés de maison. Il apparaît
alors que l’imaginaire politique de la Gauche irakienne était largement partagé par
la région limitrophe.
Mots-clés : coup d’État, employés de maison, travail, migration, pèlerinages, Irak,
Iran 
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Literature Review
While human geographers long monopolized the study of citizens’ tran-
sits across the borders that divide modern nation-states, historians have
begun to take account of communities’ movements through space.
Furthermore, the emergence of “border studies” as a field of inquiry has
united scholars working in geography with those from anthropology,
economics, political science, and sociology. The foundation of an
association for Borderlands Studies accompanied the establishment of a
number of university programs (including those at arizona State
University, Earlham College, Lake Forest College, and New Mexico State
University in the United States) that offer courses and support theses
centred on frontiers. Newly published documents such as those of
Schofield (1989) suggest that the boundary between arab Iraq and neigh-
bouring Iran can be conceptualized as the result of a historical process
(rather than a historical fact), and projects such as those of Maktabi
(1999), Thompson (2000), Kern (2001), Simon (2002), Mojtahed-Zadeh
(2007), El-azhary (2012), and ates (2013) are benefitting (even if  indi-
rectly) from these developments. 
Our story begins with the most prominent individuals, and the
ways in which public figures transited the boundaries between the coun-
tries they led.
Border Crossings by Heads of State
afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey were joined in the Saadabad Pact of
friendship and nonaggression from 1937; while afghanistan shares no
boundaries with the other states, Iran shares frontiers with both Iraq and
Turkey. Marashi (2012) draws attention to border crossings by these
countries’ heads of state, as when Iranian Rez Sh h Pahlav ’s motorcade
crossed into Turkey at a designated point along the Maku–Erzerum road.
a triumphal arch adorned with flags marked their common border; when
the Sh h arrived, two honour guards representing the national militaries
of the two states played national anthems. Such a border-crossing cere-
mony, Marashi writes, “suggests how important the public marking of
political boundaries had become for each state” (2012, 1929). The
grandiose trappings—honour guard, motorcade, and triumphal arch—
underscore the rarefied nature of such transits. 
another example demonstrates how exceptional it was for
members of the Pahlav  family to enter other states, and opens Marashi’s
discussion to Iran’s neighbour. One Sunday morning, Iran’s Royal Guard
attempted to arrest the Mossadiq government in Tehran. When this
failed, Mohammad Rez  Pahlav  and his young wife fled the country. In
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Baghdad, the Iraq Times reported that the Shh and Queen Soraya
“arrived unexpectedly” in a twin-engine De Havilland plane, landing
unannounced at Baghdad airport just as the Iraqi cabinet was assembling
to await King Feisal’s scheduled return from amman. The unanticipated
visitors, with their two small suitcases, were whisked away to the Qasr al-
abiad guesthouse (“Shah comes,” 1953). as police secured their plane
that afternoon, King Feisal greeted them informally at his uncle’s home,
the Qasr ar-Rihab (“Shah at tea,” 1953). 
The question of how long Mohammad Rez  and his wife would
stay in Iraq took on urgent diplomatic importance. a customs officer at
the airport told the Iraq Times that the Pahlav  monarch planned to stay
“a few days.” as the two visitors left by car for Kerbala, the U.S. Embassy
quietly cabled Washington for instructions. Iraq’s acting foreign minister
told an american diplomat that “he felt that the Shah should not stay out
of the country longer than a week or so”; publicly, Iran’s chargé d’affaires
in Baghdad had warned the host government to “see that nothing is done
regarding the Shah’s presence that might damage future relations between
the two nations” (USNa, RG 84, box 40, folder 350). Suitably intimi-
dated, Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign affairs hustled Mohammad Rez  and
Soraya Bakhtiari onto a commercial flight to Rome the following
morning (USNa, RG 84, box 40, folder 350). Both Rez  Sh h Pahlav ’s
triumphant journey to Turkey and Mohammad Rez ’s disorganized
retreat to Iraq differed from the voyages of ordinary citizens.
The Border Crossings of Military Conscripts and Diplomats
Iran’s modern rulers (both father and son) had crossed borders either with
a highly disciplined personal guard or with no any official attendants at
all; both state and informal visits were carefully scripted so as to mini-
mize, if  not eliminate, threats to the security of local populations. as we
shall see, such ceremonial displays of civility contrast with more conven-
tional exhibitions of violence on both sides of the border; while national
anthems preoccupied leaders, conscripts sought to augment their rations.
a number of incidents preceded Mohammad Rez ’s impromptu flight to
Baghdad. First, three Iranian soldiers were arrested over the border; then
the local authorities returned the intruders to Iran “in the interest of the
friendly relations existing between the two countries” (“Iraq Protests,”
1953). as Baghdad Radio’s deputy director acknowledged (“armed
Iranian soldiers have begun to infiltrate Iraqi territory and to commit
outrages on the inhabitants of peaceful villages,” stealing cattle “and
anything else they can lay their hands on”), incursions on Iraqi sover-
eignty disturbed the peace (“Iranian Raids,” 1953). 
Shortly thereafter, armed civilians accompanied 20 Iranian soldiers
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across the border into Iraqi Kurdistan; these motley elements stole 615
head of sheep belonging to the Jaf tribe in the village of Lale Deh,
wounding several shepherds (“Iranian Press,” 1953). a week later, a third
group crossed 5 km into the Benawa Suta area, where “they attempted to
loot the sheep of the village” (“Iranian Raids,” 1953). “Some casualties
occurred” as shepherds and police sought to protect local property, and
“eight Iranian soldiers, including the outpost commander, were captured
on Iraqi soil and taken to Penjwin,” a spokesman added (“Iraq Protests,”
1953). 
The Hashemite monarchy congratulated itself  on their restraint. For
its part, Iraq “was judicious in avoiding a deterioration in its relations”
with the larger and more populous state on its border. Ultimate responsi-
bility was laid at the door of Tehran’s newspaper editors, who (unlike their
counterparts in Baghdad) reflected a variety of opinions. Iraq’s director
general of propaganda blamed editors over the border for a “hostile
campaign undertaken by certain Iranian newspapers against the arabs;
Iraq in particular” (“Iraq Protests,” 1953). acknowledging the distance
between governors and governed in the Saadabad countries, Iraq’s official
spokesman distanced the nationalist position available in print from the
alleged preferences of a more conservative public: “Press attacks do not
always reflect the true feelings of a country” (“Iranian Press,” 1953). 
The Saadabad Pact gave rise to obfuscating heads of state, thieving
soldiers, wary shepherds, and—finally—posturing diplomats. The
summer Mohammad Rez and his wife landed at Baghdad airport, alle-
gations circulated that foreigners were using Iraqi territory to undermine
Iran’s elected representatives (“Iraq Reprimanded,” 1953). as
Mohammad Mossadegh fought to defend the prime minister’s preroga-
tives, British military intelligence broadcast radio programs over the
border (“anti Mossadeq agent,” 1953); the Iranian government
protested “the flight of British planes” over their sovereign territory
(“Iraq Denies,” 1953). 
When Premier Mussadeq expelled the United Kingdom’s entire
diplomatic staff, a “cavalcade of 27 cars … set out on the road to
Baghdad,” carrying the British Embassy’s secret files (Kimche 1950, 362).
From allegations that the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq had sheltered
those seeking to undermine the constitutional order in Iran, Baghdad
Radio sought refuge in rhetoric: “Since no planes of any nationality have
flown over the Iranian territory or the Iraqi-Iranian border and since the
Iraqi embassy in Tehran has received no protest in this connection, the
report should therefore be considered as biased and unfounded” (“Report
of Protest,” 1953). Iraq’s director of propaganda assumed that the citi-
zens of neighbouring Iran embraced more conservative positions than
those of newspaper editors.
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Border Crossings by Ordinary Citizens
Petroleum was in the process of creating a community of politically aware
persons on both sides of the Iran–Iraq border. after World War II, citi-
zens of Iran and Iraq came to share a common economy, giving rise to
comparable political goals. This common economy was based on a foun-
dation laid before the war. The Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) and the
anglo-Iranian Oil Company (aIOC) prospected together for a long time,
but differences persisted: Tehran’s petroleum economy was six times as
large as that of its neighbour, and the aIOC was among the owners of the
IPC. also, since the aIOC built refineries before the IPC, more jobs were
available in Iran than in Iraq (Shwadran 1955, 278). 
Two demographic groups in Iraq crossed into Iran on a regular basis
during the first decade of the Cold War. In recognition of what Tavakoli-
Targhi (2001, x) has called “homeless texts,” the records of such visits can
only be pieced together from multiple archives that collectively yield a
“hybridization of cultures and the invention of national selves.”
Language proved no insurmountable barrier during the first decade after
the Second World War; as activist Fahima Sadiq told a journalist, because
many Iraqis spoke the Iranian language or understood it, she was able to
strike up conversations with people around her (Sadik 1959). as we shall
see, two constituencies incorporated cross-border wanderings into their
life strategies: older members of the Shi‘a community, and middle-class
families (and their servants) from Basra. 
Older Shi‘a Muslims were accustomed to make pilgrimage to
northern Iran, where they visited the mausoleum of Sultan Mohammad
Taher and the shrine of Qassem ibn-Musa Kazim. Most of these men
travelled without government documents, so they would engage a river
canoe (bellum) and cross the Kur River at Meshed, also known as
Mansurabad. In this way, the pilgrims could enter Iran at night with as
little fanfare as possible. Once safely landed on the eastern shore, they
would thumb a ride and eventually catch the bus to Tehran and points
north. The american consul in Basra reported that “the total cost of the
Basra-Roda [Roodbar Kola] round trip is about 12 Iraqi dinars” (at the
time, one Iraq dinar equalled approximately US$2.80, for a total cost of
US$33.60). If  border guards on either the Iraqi or the Iranian side
detained an undocumented traveller, “the matter is fixed on the spot with
a bribe amounting to roughly half  a dinar” (USNa, RG 84, box 40, folder
350). The border town’s population doubled during the first post-war
decade (Sumner 1989, 634), mutely attesting to the number of such trav-
ellers.
Similarly, middle-class Iraqis were accustomed to vacationing en
famille. In general, middle-class Iraqis preferred to spend their summer
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vacations in cooler climates; the royal family travelled every summer to
Kurdistan (where they had built a villa in 1953) or the Côte d’azur; polit-
ical leaders travelled to Europe, and civil servants to Lebanon (BE,
Records of Iraq, XI, pp. 102–3). Basra port employees and those who
worked for petroleum companies preferred a change in the cost of living
to a change in climate, which they could achieve by crossing the border
into Iran—where, following the nationalization of the aIOC, the local
currency was falling (Groseclose 1952). The national airline offered an
excursion fare of 25 dinar to Tehran, round-trip (“Iraqi airways,” 1953).
During the hottest days of June and July, “large numbers of middle class
Basra families are spending their vacations in and around Tehran, instead
of going to Lebanon,” where the currency (pegged to sterling) had
remained stable. 
Some of these families travelled with children and domestic servants.
The U.S. consul to Iraq’s southern port reported that “as many as thirty
families have left … to Khormanshahr by automobile and from there by
train to Tehran,” accompanied by maids and nannies (USNa, RG 84, box
40, folder 350). Women employed as domestic servants were a significant
constituency for Iraq’s communist party, whose underground publishing
house, Dar al-Hikma, had translated Engels’ Origins of the Family, Private
Property, and the State (Bashkin 2009, 75), with its assertion that women’s
oppression was the result of class society and the nuclear family. That
summer, Iraq’s government was acquitting Fatima amin ahmad for lack of
evidence of her political activity, justifying her presence in the communists’
safe house because she “was merely acting as a housekeeper to the others”
(“Communists Sentenced,” 1953). at the time, the communist party’s dues-
paying members were concentrated in the south and in the capital; of 415
nationwide, only 48 resided in Basra (alexander 2008, 262).
Older Shi‘a men, petroleum clerks and their wives, domestic servants—
all related political news they had heard over the border. Thanks to the
travel of these three groups, rumours spread in Iraq that the military in
neighbouring Iran would establish a dictatorship similar to that prevailing
in Syria; “with regard to Mossadegh they quote an old arab proverb,
‘Mossadegh holds the strings but the ball of twine is not in his hands’”
(USNa, RG 84, box 40, folder 350). In this way, Iraq’s southern port city
received news of Fazlollah Zahedi’s role in a counter coup of 19 august
1953 even before the Shah and his wife landed in the capital. 
Iraq’s First Refinery Promises Iraqis Coveted “Modern” Jobs
Brought by pilgrims, vacationers, and their domestic servants, word of
another model circulated in Iraq. Over the border at abadan, the aIOC’s
“company town” provided workers with housing and transport; in addi-
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tion, medical care was available for dependents at no charge. Such bene-
fits were not equally available to labourers and managers alike, as long as
foreigners made policy decisions at the abadan facility. While at the time
of the aIOC’s nationalization no facility on the Iraqi side of the border
compared with abadan, the legal structure was in place for a larger
government role. Through law no. 11 of 1951, Iraq ratified the
International Labour Organization’s employment service convention of
1948, no. 88, providing for the organization of national employment
offices (Badre 1959, 32–33). 
In Iraq, wage payments consisted of a base salary (whether according
to contract, monthly, or daily rates) and a number of additional
allowances. at the lowest classification of day wages (0.45 Iraqi dinar), a
worker was eligible for merit awards (of an additional 0.02 dinar);
however, the number of merit awards was capped at 2. In addition to merit
awards, employees were eligible for “cost of living,” “pipeline location,”
“drilling location,” “dirty work,” and “shift” allowances. Finally, an
allowance was payable to employees required to travel on duty away from
their normal base and away from areas in which company housing and/or
cafeterias were available (Badre 1959, 57–59). In addition to wages, petro-
leum companies provided housing according to citizenship and seniority:
“as part of the expatriate employment contract, the companies provided
not only houses at or near the work sites, but also made available the
complete furnishings and household utensils, with full maintenance for
the houses, gardens, and all attached facilities.” Fences, sentries, and
guards separated foreigners’ housing compounds from accommodations
for employees paid by the month or day lived (Badre 1959, 79–80). 
In Basra, new housing was already being built for workers at “Zubair
City” (Lenczowski 1960, 187). This development was tied to the decision
to expand company operations in the Rumaila sector, two hours from
Basra by car. The company had chosen an “integration” policy
(increasing its dependence on local businesses), as opposed to providing
directly for workers’ housing, transport, and medical needs, as the aIOC
did over the border at abadan (USNa, RG 84, box 45, folder 560.2).
Foreign journalists reported a general impression that the petroleum
company would provide public medical services. “Word passed through
the local villages that I.P.C. policy was to give medical treatment to the
natives, even if  they weren’t”; an IPC dentist “found himself  confronted
at a pipeline station with a queue of 150 Bedouin tribesman demanding
treatment” (Faltermayer and Linge 1958).
Near the Iraqi capital, the country’s first refinery was scheduled to
open. Named after the village in which it is located, on the left bank of the
Tigris downstream and 20 km southwest of Baghdad, Daurah promised
Iraqis “modern” jobs with full benefits, comparable to those at abadan.
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already workers were laying railway lines to the site of the new refinery
and putting in place a 135-mile 12-inch pipeline to supply crude oil. Iraqis
were poorly remunerated for the “unskilled” jobs of laying railway lines
and fitting pipeline, and these short-term jobs would end when construc-
tion was complete. Scheduled to begin operations within two years,
Daurah would have a production capacity of 250 000 tons a year, which
would make it the largest single industrial plant in the country (“King
addresses,”1954). Iraq’s opposition parties seized on the prospect of
“skilled” jobs at the refinery to transform the country’s economy. article
31 of Iraq’s labour law no. 72 for 1936 had authorized the government to
regulate public employment, and public employment offices had opened
in all the country’s major cities in 1946. While the state placed no obliga-
tions on employers to recruit workers through these offices, and while job
seekers’ participation was strictly voluntary, recruitment committees
(composed of four employers’ and four workers’ representatives) advised
the director of the Department of Labour.
A Wave of Strikes Erupts Across the Country
Having established that Iraqis of all walks of life—the middle class,
elderly Shi‘a, male and female political radicals—travelled to Iran regu-
larly, and having identified the new refinery at Daurah as a model for the
preferred kind of work, we can now discuss the Basra Petroleum
Company (BPC) strikes. Iraq’s legally registered opposition and political
left looked over the border to Iran. abadan may have served Iraq’s inter-
nationalists as a helpful model while they built union organizations
among employees of the BPC in the south of their own country. The U.S.
vice consul in Basra, Charles L. Widney, Jr., was a close observer: 
[I have] spoken to a number of people within the company who have had close
association with the workers and others described. I have mingled among
demonstrators and heard part of the speeches and recognized some of the
speakers. I have discussed the personalities involved discreetly but at length with
lawyers and others not associated either with the government or the Company
(USNa, RG 84, box 45, folder 560.2).
In December 1953, with the support of their family members, men
walked off  their jobs as bus drivers for Basra municipality; dockworkers,
dredgers, and radio operators followed them. Widney recounted that the
news of plans for a strike circulated through areas of the city where
women bought and sold daily provisions: “In every instance the pattern
has been the same. Rumours are heard in the local market (suk) that a
strike is going to take place in such and such a place, and on such and such
a day. Nothing happens on that day but several days later the strike
occurs” (USNa, RG 84, box 45, folder 560.2). Even though the radio
operators’ strike was broken within a few hours, BPC employees followed
others’ example. 
For BPC employees, a company decision to transfer number of
workers and their immediate dependents from the city to new homes in
Zubair City set off  the strike. The company’s provision of housing for a
few families threatened the extended support networks that offered
workers a form of collective security. “about twelve of these families
complained about this move [against their will]. They wished to continue
to live in Basra [among their extended families] and to be transported at
the Company’s expense to the oil field daily.” Once they moved to the
housing development, Zubair City’s workers would lose their transporta-
tion allowances. “about forty of these workers wanted the Company to
let them keep the allowances and provide transportation on company-
owned and -operated buses” (USNa, RG 84, box 45, folder 560.2)
Widney was under the impression that while local labour organizers
were disorganized, they were supported by national labour leaders in
Baghdad and by the opposition National Democratic Party (al-Hizb al-
Watani al-Dimuqrati, NDP) supported them, and they even received help
from the Tudeh Party over the border. Local authorities believed that the
strikers’ first leaflet had been printed in abadan because it reached Basra
so quickly (USNa, RG 84, box 45, folder 560.2). The U.S. consul was
confident that—without any assistance from Iran—members of Iraq’s
own opposition, the NDP, made the Basra strikes possible: “The strike
was directed from the headquarters of this party in Basra with its official
newspaper Wida’ al-Ahali appealing daily for public support of the move-
ment” (“Turmoil,” 1953), and it was led by Kamil al-Jaderji, “one of
Iraq’s ablest politicians and richest landlords” (Kimche 1950, 96). 
While they enjoyed the support of established political parties, the
strike leaders themselves were of lower-middle-class background. Strike
committee chair Jamil Mirjan Rehani was a secondary school graduate.
In his early twenties, he worked as laboratory assistant in the Petrology
and Engineering Department; it was he who “did most of the talking to
the assembled crowds” (USNa, RG 84, box 45, folder 560.2). a driver,
Jabbar Hamudi Sabir, was also on the committee; while Sabir had no
particular affiliation with any registered political party, “his speeches and
talks as a negotiator with the company officials and local authorities
reflected the communist line.” Other organizers included clerk abdul
amir al-Shawi, engine attendant Jabbar Hadi, and mechanic abdul
Kadhim Mustafa (USNa, RG 84, box 45, folder 560.2). 
Mohammed Rashid, a Basra attorney in his late twenties, edited
Wida’ al-Ahali; a second contributor was another local lawyer,
Mohammad amin al-aradi. as the NDP’s principles of “democratic
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socialism” recognized private ownership, limited free enterprise, the
nationalization of industry, and state ownership of essential utilities
(Khadduri 1973, 138), the party served as political home to a large
number of the urban bourgeoisie, including left-to-centre intellectuals,
students, and professionals. While Rashid and aradi worked together to
plan the petroleum workers’ strike, they differed in their ideological orien-
tation: “al-Rashid’s articles unequivocally echoed the Communist line
faithfully while al-aradi’s was strictly ultra-nationalistic and anti-
British” (Haj 1997, 87). 
Political party membership within the larger strike committee was
equally diverse. Rehani “belong[ed] to a well-known middle class Basra
family long connected with senior statesman Salih Jabr’s Umma Socialist
party,” and the party secretary in Basra confirmed his affiliation. as histo-
rian Hanna Batatu (1983, 466) points out, the party’s name was
misleading: “one-time Prime Minister Salih Jabr christened his party,
which was anchored on landowners and semi feudal tribal sheikhs, the
‘Socialist Party of the Nation’: he was only one of the many who in that
decade wrapped themselves with the cloak of socialism in the hope of
borrowing a little of its popularity.” However, there is no independent
evidence that Jabr’s Umma party helped organize the Basra strikes
(USNa, RG 84, box 45, Folder 560.2). 
The Strikers’ Widening Demands
Initially seeking only to remain in their homes and continue to receive
their transportation allowances, strikers broadened their goals and
demanded administrative equality for the workers. They wanted a single
personnel policy to cover all jobs—goals similar to those already achieved
by activists over the border in abadan. The Basra strikers demanded that
BPC cease procuring services from subcontractors who paid less than
BPC did; they insisted on free medical services for all workers and their
dependents, with the additional promise that any worker who recovered
from illness would be returned to full employment (USNa, RG 84, box
45, folder 560.2). Interpreted more broadly, the strikes were part of oil
workers’ agitation for better pay and conditions (Tripp 2002, 135); for
Podeh (2011, 133), the oil workers’ strike marked the beginning of the
Ba’ath party’s long struggle to prominence. 
The Basra strikers demanded that the category of “temporary
employees” be eliminated, so that all workers (including watchmen)
would have permanent jobs and be entitled to all rights guaranteed by the
amended Workers’ Law no. 72 of 1936. all company employees would
then receive transport, free meals, and medical care for themselves and
their dependents, be paid for their annual leave in cash, and be free to live
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in housing of their choice (USNa, RG 84, box 45, folder 560.2). again,
such demands suggest that these workers had embraced goals similar to
the policies already in place at the aIOC’s abadan facility. 
Finally, the strikers had explicitly political demands. They sought
payment of wages forfeited during the 1951 strike, the re-hiring of all
workers fired for trade-union activity during that labour action, and legal
recognition for their own association, a Union of the Oil Workers of
Basra (USNa, RG 84, box 45, folder 560.2). While the International
Labour Organization had sponsored Convention 87, guaranteeing the
freedom of association, in 1948, Iraq had not ratified it; at the time, orga-
nizations such as trade unions and political parties were required to
register with the Ministry of the Interior in order to establish a legal iden-
tity for the purpose of opening bank accounts and securing space for
meetings (as when the NDP’s middle-class members met in the Stars [al-
Nujum] cinema; “31 acquitted,” 1954). 
at first, it seemed the strike would be resolved easily and peacefully,
since “an atmosphere of good humour prevailed throughout the city and
among the strikers” (USNa, RG 84, box 45, folder 560.2). The BPC had
already agreed to apply the labour law to those employed in messes and
kitchens and to all monthly-rate employees (USNa, RG 84, box 45, folder
560.2). Convening early in the morning, and lasting until just before
sundown, Rehani’s “speech-making was strictly communist with the
usual key phrases of ‘anglo-american imperialist,’ ‘anglo-american
criminals and warmongers,’ ‘colonizing and exploiting imperialists’”
(USNa, RG 84, box 45, folder 560.2). Shop owners in the bazaar and
neighbourhood stores extended credit to strikers’ families; members of
extended families aided others, and contractors even advanced wages to
their employees who had decided to participate in the walkout. Picketers
took breaks for lunch, and permitted foreign employees to cross their
lines unmolested throughout the first day (USNa, RG 84, box 45, folder
560.2).
Having read strikers’ demands published in the daily newspaper, a
British BPC employee encountered a group of strikers in the oil field; he
alleged that they attempted to disrupt the activities of some non-striking
contract workers. One shot was fired. Provoked, the strikers attacked him
and seized his weapon. accounts of the shooting also facilitated commu-
nists’ entry into what had previously been an NDP-dominated strike
(USNa, RG 84, box 45, folder 560.2). after the shooting, abbas abdul
Muttalib al-Mudhaffar was caught with a flyer titled “announcement by
the Local Committee of the Communist Party of Iraq in Basra”; he also
had a copy of a pamphlet titled “The Communist Party of the Soviet
Union’s Fiftieth anniversary” (“Basra Court,” 1954).
The minister of the interior arrived in Basra, immediately calling for
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a round of discussions. afterward, he claimed that a delegation of
workers had “disclosed to me the real situation in the strike and the
motives for it” (“Basra Strike,” 1953). Satisfied that the majority of
workers wanted to return to their jobs but were afraid to do so lest the
strikers become violent, he guaranteed adequate police protection to any
who wanted to return to their jobs. He personally warned “elements from
among the active demonstrators [that] he intended to maintain law and
order by force if  necessary.” During the night of 14 December, the
minister ordered the arrest of 16 known ringleaders and broke the strike
(USNa, RG 84, box 45, folder 560.2).
Conclusion
The following day, those workers who retained their freedom returned to
their jobs. They would remain at their places of employment until the
Tammuz revolution occurred five years later. 
The Tammuz revolution of 1958, like the Zahedi coup five years
earlier, witnessed multiple border crossings between Iran and Iraq. When
news reached Basra by radio of developments in the capital on 14 July
1958, Iraq citizens replaced all the European employees at local power
stations; photographs of Egyptian president Gamal abdel Nasser
appeared in prominent positions (“americans Delayed,” 1958). Thirty
dependents of U.S. employees of Morrison Knudson left Basra on char-
tered aircraft (“Iraqi Pleads,” 1958); the border to Iran remained open for
official transit two days a week (Hunt 1958). as a revolution was taking
place over the border in Iraq, the Soviet ambassador, Pegov, requested an
audience with Iran’s Shh in Tehran. While “it was expected that he
wanted to relay a stern Moscow warning that Iran must not be used as a
base for counter-revolution against the new Iraqi regime,” in fact the
diplomat invited Mohammad Rez  Pahlav  to return to Moscow for a
second visit (Bigart 1958). The Sh h and Queen Soraya had paid a state
visit to the U.S.S.R. during the Suez crisis of June–July 1956, before their
divorce.
There is a distinct emphasis on individual agency among transna-
tional anthropologists writing on border crossing. as just one example,
Sarah Mahler and Patricia Pessar (2001) identify a “transnational cogni-
tive space” to discuss individuality when writing on transnational migra-
tion. For many scholars, a focus on border crossing permits them to
acknowledge agency, distancing themselves from a monolithic, stable,
and naturalized understanding of culture. Cláudia Nascimento (2008, 58)
accepts such border-crossers as “not any less authentic or natural than
ones relation to her original culture.” Here, we acknowledge forms of
collective identity for those who have crossed borders. While Iraqi
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workers may not have wanted Mohammad Rez Sh h Pahlav  or his
soldiers in Iraq, their political imaginary incorporated Iranian models as
their own. 
Never simply the sum total of transits by heads of state, Iraq’s border
with Iran was crossed by men and women of different economic positions.
Older Iraqi Shi‘a men often crossed the border to visit pilgrimage desti-
nations in Iran; facing a political crisis, Iran’s young leader and his wife
reversed the direction of their transit, finding a day’s respite in Karbala.
In this discussion, we have drawn attention to the wider influence that
developments in Iran had on politics in Iraq. Nationalization of petro-
leum production lured Iraqi vacationers over the border, where middle-
class employers and their domestic workers learned the latest news.
Breaking away from a model that emphasizes individual agency, we note
that these forms of border crossing led to collective forms of political
agency such as the strike organized by employees of the BPC. Such a shift
toward collective agency redirects master narratives such as “self” and
“other,” “domestic” and “foreign,” nationalist and internationalist,
toward new outcomes. The coming together of Iraqi and Iranian labour
activists’ political imaginaries in the BPC strikes did not lead to (nor
would it necessarily lead to) a collapse of boundaries between the two
countries. Temporary and contingent comings-together, however, serve as
evidence of widespread (if  unsanctioned) border crossing. 
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Information Technology and the “Arab Spring”
Emily Fekete and Barney Warf
Department of Geography, University of Kansas,
Lawrence, KS 66045    U.S.A.
The demonstrations, revolts, and protests collectively known as the “Arab Spring”
have destabilized many long-standing autocratic governments in the Middle East.
Central to this process were several types of information technology, including
mobile phones, the Internet, notably social media platforms such as Twitter,
YouTube, and Facebook. Unfortunately, this issue is often represented in simplistic,
technologically deterministic terms. This article examines the distribution and
growth of several digital information technologies in seven countries rocked by
recent protests. It then outlines government attempts to censor the Arab Internet,
and details how various information technologies—particularly video—were used
by the Arab masses. Next it offers a conceptual analysis grounded in the works of
Jürgen Habermas, asserting that information technology has democratized the
sphere of public debate throughout the Arab world.
Keywords: Arab Spring, information technology, Internet, YouTube, Twitter
Les manifestations, révoltes et autres protestations connues sous le nom de
« Printemps arabe » ont déstabilisé de nombreux régimes autocratiques du Moyen-
Orient solidement ancrés. Au cœur de ce dispositif figurent différentes technologies
de l’information : les téléphones portables, Internet et notamment les réseaux
sociaux tels Twitter, YouTube et Facebook. Malheureusement, cette question est
souvent présentée en des termes simplistes de technologie déterministe. Cet article
examine la répartition et la croissance de plusieurs technologies d’information
numérique dans sept pays secoués par les protestations récentes. Il présente ensuite
les efforts des autorités pour censurer l’Internet arabe et décrit comment les diffé-
rents types de technologies de l’information, particulièrement la vidéo, ont été
utilisés par les masses arabes. Il présente ensuite une analyse conceptuelle ancrée
dans les travaux de Jürgen Habermas, qui affirme que la technologie de l’informa-
tion a démocratisé la sphère du débat public dans tout le Monde arabe. 
Mots-clés : Printemps arabe, technologies de l´information, Internet, YouTube,
Twitter
The popular rebellions that have destabilized, and sometimes over-
thrown, some autocratic arab governments since early 2011 have been
the focus of  considerable scholarly scrutiny. Beginning with Tunisia’s
Jasmine Revolution, democratic movements consisting of  hundreds of
thousands of  protestors, which enjoyed varying degrees of  success,
The Arab World Geographer / Le Géographe du monde arabe  Vol 16, no 2 (2013)
Information Technology and the “Arab Spring” 211
became collectively known as the “arab Spring” (anderson 2011; Gause
2011; Lynch 2013). This loose collection of  demonstrations, protests,
riots, and, in the case of  Syria, civil war has ushered in a new political
chapter throughout the arab world, with far-reaching implications.
One of  the more insidious myths about the “arab Spring” concerns
the determinant role of  information technologies: Web  sites, chat
rooms, and media stories contained numerous references to a
“Facebook Revolution” or “YouTube Revolt.” There can be no doubt
that information and communications technologies greatly enable
popular political mobilization (Castells et al. 2007; Shirky 2011;
Iskander 2011). However, in the technologically determinist, overly
optimistic view that has played an important part in public discourses
on the “arab Spring,” widespread access to the Internet, YouTube,
Facebook, and Twitter led directly to unrest and revolt as users,
primarily the young, were introduced to new sources of  information and
digital means of  organizing. Unfortunately, the hyperbole swirling
around this type of  technological determinism is simplistic. For
example, after the 2009 elections in Iran, there was much talk of  a
“Twitter Revolution,” and Twitter was nominated for the Nobel Peace
Prize, even though at the time only 0.9 % of  Iranians were actually on
Twitter (Morozov 2011). Many forces other than information tech-
nology played key roles in driving the events of  the “arab Spring,”
including widespread poverty, unemployment, rising food prices, and
pervasive unhappiness with uncaring, corrupt, and frequently repres-
sive governments. a more subtle and compelling view of  information
technology (IT) in the arab context notes the prominence of  national
telecommunications providers, leading to high prices for access and use
of  IT; shortages of  broadband; pronounced rural–urban divides; and
the continued importance of  face-to-face contacts and word of  mouth
as means of  transmitting information. Thus, rather than causing the
“arab Spring,” IT must be seen as enabling it. 
IT plays an increasingly important role in the dissemination of
information about current events. In particular, it allows for “scale
jumping,” the ability to transcend the confining effects of  scale (adams
1996). Given human geography’s recent attempts to destabilize the
taken-for-grantedness of  scale and reveal it as a social construction
(Marston, Jones, and Woodward 2005), stimulating a lively debate
about the meaning and relevance of  scale in a relational world (Paasi
2004; Jones 2009; MacKinnon 2010), the scalar dimensions of  IT use in
the “arab Spring” should be noted. National borders were significant,
both because governments tried to limit flows of  information beyond
their borders, effectively keeping protests confined within their respec-
tive national territories, and because rebel groups sought precisely to
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transcend those borders, using digital media to attract foreign audiences
and turning local uprisings into objects of  international attention.
Subverting dominant scales can be a means to address the balance of
power between prevailing discourses in society and those groups whose
grievances originate from the social margins. Political dissent can
“reach beyond the boundaries of  place through communication media
to substantiate their political claims, create openings for new ideas of
scale and new scales of  connection, and thereby challenge the social
hierarchies embedded in pre-existing territorial contexts” (adams 1996,
420). Telecommunications technologies provide a medium to allow
messages outside the typical state-sanctioned information to be circu-
lated throughout the population.
This article focuses IT’s role in the “arab Spring” in several ways.
We begin with a Habermasian conceptual analysis that asserts that
digital media have enlarged the arena of  public debate within arab
states by facilitating bypassing of  government gatekeepers of  informa-
tion and by giving voice to the voiceless. Second, we offer an overview
of the degree to which digital media have diffused through the societies
in question, including mobile phones and the Internet. Third, we turn to
the attempts by many arab governments to control flows of  informa-
tion within and across their borders, including censorship. Fourth, we
chart empirically how various digital technologies played key roles in
fomenting unrest, noting the significance of  video as well as that of  the
social media platforms Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. The conclu-
sion reiterates our major findings.
Arab Cyberdemocracies? A Habermasian Critique
as several scholars have argued, digital technologies are gradually
undermining state control of  information in many societies, slowly
encouraging moves toward more democratic forms of  governance
(Slane 2007). Cyberspace by itself, of  course, does not automatically
produce positive or negative effects, for the information that circulates
over the Web or on Twitter is invariably mediated through national and
local political cultures, including censorship and self-censorship.
Within the arab world, as mounting numbers of  people—particularly
the young—gain access to and become comfortable with digital tech-
nologies, the Internet has dramatically expanded opportunities for
diffusing political information and mobilizing in political activity,
undermining long-held monopolies over the mass media. Cyberspace is
relatively cheap and easy to use, which eliminates two serious obstacles
to use by the poor. Because digital communications have become
widely dispersed, cyberspace and civil society are now locked in an
ongoing process of  mutual transformation and co-evolution.
IT in the “arab Spring” bears an uncannily close resemblance to
Jürgen Habermas’s (1979, 1989) famous “ideal speech situation,” a
hypothetical arena characterized by unrestrained discourse in which
truth is socially constructed in the absence of  political and economic
obstacles to communication. Habermas’s line of  thought—which
evolved decades before the Internet became widespread among the
public—holds that unconstrained communications are essential to the
social processes of  constructing a consensus, in which participants may
participate regardless of  their social positionality. The ideal speech
situation serves as a counterfactual yardstick to assess various social
contexts and the obstacles that generate distorted communication
(Bernstein 1995; Luhmann 1996). In this world  view, truth is not
located in some abstract, transcendental Platonic realm but is deeply
grounded in social praxis. 
Cyberspace arguably exemplifies the Habermasian vision more
powerfully than does any other social phenomenon today (Salter
2003). E-mail, YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and related technologies
such as mobile phones have greatly empowered many citizens of  arab
countries, facilitated raucous and unfettered debates, and generated
significant, if  occasionally unintended, political outcomes. Such an
argument is not meant to glorify digital technologies uncritically or to
engage in a simplistic form of  determinism; the digital divide within the
arab world, as manifested in serious discrepancies in access depending
on age, gender, and educational level, testifies that the region’s
pronounced social and spatial inequalities are replicated in arab cyber-
space. Distinct digital divides do exist when it comes to Internet access
in arab nations, and most people who are online belong to the rela-
tively wealthier segments of  their societies. For this reason, many initial
protestors in arab societies, especially Egypt, were members of  the
upper middle class and able to access Internet sites to coordinate their
activities (Faris 2013). 
arab government attempts at censorship, which are exposed most
flagrantly during moments of  acute political crisis, constitute another
significant obstacle. Despite these limitations, however, digital tech-
nologies have clearly had profound impacts on the arab public’s
capacity to make its collective voice heard. Froomkin (2003, 856)
argues that, “in Habermasian terms, the Internet draws power back
into the public sphere, away from other systems.” 
It is worth noting that the Habermasian ideal type of  societies
that enjoy unfettered freedom of  communication is not without its
critics. In particular, Fraser (2007) takes Habermas to task for a
geographic imaginary that implicitly centres on the Westphalian world
order of  self-contained national states, particularly through his
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emphasis on national languages, national economies, and national
media channels. IT and globalization have posed decisive challenges to
this assumption, making national borders more porous and public
spheres ever more transnational in character.
Charting the Arab Space of Flows
IT in various forms has long played an important role in the cultural
and political life of  various Muslim societies (Warf  and Vincent 2007).
Cassette tapes, for example, were important in the 1979 revolution that
toppled the Shah of  Iran. Cassettes are still popular in many arab
countries, including Egypt (Hirschkind 2006). However, the rise of
digital technologies has greatly reduced their use as other forms of
media, notably the Internet, have grown in significance. 
Despite the media and scholarly attention devoted to the role of
the Internet in the “arab Spring,” in reality it is mobile phones (cell-
phones) that are by far the most widespread digital technology in the
region. Some mobile phones, of  course, can access the Internet, so this
distinction at times is unclear; however, in most developing countries,
“smart phones” with Internet access are relatively uncommon. as
Table 1 shows, the seven countries that have experienced the most
pronounced upheaval have essentially ubiquitous mobile phone usage:
in many countries, mobile phone penetration rates exceed 100 %, and
only in Syria and Yemen is usage relatively low. a cottage industry of
scholars has documented the enormous role this technology has played
in reshaping everyday life around the world (Ling 2004, 2010; Farman
2011), but relatively little has been said about its political implications.
Mobile communication technologies allow users to interact with one
another to an unprecedented degree and have led to a mounting
porosity between the private and public realms. as Sheller and Urry
(2006) note, mobile information technologies have had profound impli-
cations for the nature of  urban public space, altering mobilities, mean-
ings, and practices and redefining location not as a given place through
which people and information flow but as a more nebulous, demateri-
alized set of  practices in which the physical and the virtual are shot
through with each other. Mobile phones, because they are cheap and
ubiquitous, offer many in the arab world—particularly those without
Internet access or with limited literacy—an unprecedented ability to
communicate at scales that transcend the domain of  face-to-face
contacts.
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Table 1: Mobile Phone (Cellphone) Penetration Rates in “Arab Spring” States, 2011








Source: International Telecommunications Union.
Internet penetration rates vary considerably among the “arab
Spring” countries (see Table 2). In poorer countries, such as Yemen, and
those in which the government has long attempted to restrict Internet use,
such as Libya, less than one-fifth of the population may enjoy access;
conversely, Bahrain’s 77 % penetration rate is equal to that of the United
States. In Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, Facebook users constitute a
majority of netizens, but this is less true elsewhere.
Table 2: Internet Penetration and Growth Rates in “Arab Spring” States
Penetration Rate, Internet Users % Growth in Facebook 
June 2012 (000s) Users 2000–12 Users (000s)
Bahrain 77.0 961.2 2 302.0 375.
Egypt 35.6 29 809.7 6 524.2 11 764.9
Jordan 38.1 2 481.9 1 848.9 n/a.
Libya 17.0 954.3 9 443.3 671.9
Syria 22.5 5 069.4 16 796.7 n/a.
Tunisia 39.1 4 196.6 4 096.6 3 246.3
Yemen 14.9 3 691.0 24 506.7 633.
Source: http://internetworldstats.com
There are, of course, wide variations within countries as well as
among them. Unfortunately, data on the age, gender, and ethnicity of
Internet users in the arab world are not widely available. If  the experience
of other countries in the developing world is any guide, however, arab
netizens are more likely to be younger, better educated, and more urban-
ized than their national counterparts who do not use the Internet. The
growth of digital technologies among arab youth has long been recog-
nized. Speaking of the Saudi context, but in comments with wide applic-
ability to young people throughout the arab world,  Kalathil and Boas
(2003, 116) note that “the current generation of Saudi youth (which is
large and growing rapidly) is better educated, more literate, and more
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aware of the outside world than ever before and is likely to want increased
access to information on the Internet.” In addition to variations in access,
there are also significant differences in the price of telecommunications
services. In countries in which governments hold telecommunications
monopolies, typically in which former state-owned firms hold a dominant
market position (e.g., Telecom Egypt, Syria Telecom), the price of access
remains comparatively high: in Syria, for example, access costs until 2003
were more than $2 per hour, in a country whose per capita income aver-
aged $110 per month (data for costs since 2003 are not available).
Internet Censorship in “Arab Spring” States
Many parts of the arab world, as well as Iran, have an unfortunately long
history of media censorship, including censorship of cyberspace
(aNHRI 2004; Warf 2010). Decades of state repression of flows of infor-
mation not conducive to state interests have produced intimidated jour-
nalists, a scarcity of good books, and a relatively quiescent media
apparatus. Most Middle Eastern governments have resorted to some kind
of limitation on free speech and the media, including technical blocking
of Web sites; legislation that restricts anonymity; intimidation, harass-
ment, or firing of journalists; cyber-assaults against opposition Web sites
(e.g., hashtag bombing on Twitter); and content manipulation of state-
run media. 
In this context, cyber-journalists, bloggers, and online news editors
have suffered penalties for “slighting the Islamic faith,” advocating “blas-
phemy” against ruling dynasties, or promoting “immoral behaviour”
defined in politically expedient terms (including pornography, homosex-
uality, and gambling). Governments in the arab world often justify
censorship on the dubious grounds that such measures protect Islamic
values against an ostensible onslaught of Western decadence (Hofheinz
2005). as numerous human-rights and civil-liberties organizations have
pointed out, however, autocratic governments are often afraid of their
citizens’ having access to any political information that might challenge
state-sanctioned discourses designed to legitimate ruling elites. 
One measure of the severity of censorship in “arab Spring” states
may be gleaned from the evaluation of Reporters Without Borders, an
NGO headquartered in Paris and arguably the world’s pre-eminent judge
of Internet censorship. Their index of Internet censorship is generated
from 50-question surveys sent to legal experts, reporters, and scholars in
each country. as Table 3 shows, the arab states in question rank quite
high, putting them among the world’s worst censors. Even the most
lenient state involved, Jordan, is nonetheless ranked 128 out of 179 coun-
tries, while Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria are among the world’s most severe
censorship regimes.
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Table 3: Reporters Without Borders Internet Censorship Scores, 2011








Source: Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index 2011–12,
http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html
a common fallacy related to censorship is the “dictator’s dilemma,”
in which autocratic governments are forced to choose between openness
to the global information economy, on the one hand, and control over
flows of news that may pose an existential threat, on the other. Morozov
(2011) is scathing in exposing the fallacy of cyber-optimism, which paints
dictators as incompetent and on the verge of being dethroned by tech-
savvy youngsters. In reality, many states, including those in the arab
world, are quite adept at identifying the potential of digital technologies
and using them against their own populations.
While arab Internet censorship is most acute in countries such as
Saudi arabia, governments in countries rocked by the “arab Spring” also
tried to limit access to the Internet and the content that residents could
access. Some countries, such as Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, are rela-
tively lenient with respect to Internet regulation; typically, such states are
oriented toward the West and at least grudgingly accept the need for
democratic access to the Internet, as is the case in Jordan (Cunningham
2002). 
Egypt, even under the Mubarak regime, was often touted as having
relatively low levels of Internet censorship. Yet in 2004 the Egyptian
government created the Department to Combat Crimes of Computers
and Internet for the purpose of monitoring “subversive” Internet sites,
and harassed computer programmers, journalists, and human rights
activists for violating censorship standards. Shuhdi Surour, Webmaster
for the newspaper al-Ahram Weekly, was jailed for posting online a poem
that was critical of the regime. However, the government’s attempts to
prevent the publication of several books led many authors to seek alter-
native outlets on the Internet (Gauch 2001). 
In Syria, the regime of Bashar al-assad routinely blocks access to
Kurdish-language news sites and any domain name ending in “.il” (Israel;
aNHRI 2004). Faced with a massive and immensely bloody uprising, the
assad regime shut down the entire Syrian Internet on 29 November 2012,
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blaming the incident on a “terrorist attack.” Syria had shut down Internet
access in specific locations over the previous 20 months, but a total
blackout had never been attempted (Chulov 2012). another shutdown
occurred on 7–8 May 2013. Many suspect that assad understands how
keeping the Internet live benefits his government by enabling tracking of
rebel groups, as he has been reported to comment on his “electronic
army” (Fisher 2012). The Syrian Electronic army, a pro-assad group, has
repeatedly hacked Web  sites and Twitter accounts of the opposition
(Perlroth 2013). although Internet service was restored within 24 hours
in the case of both blackouts, the blackout is a testament to the complete
control governments have over communications when there are few
service providers.
Similarly, cellphone data are suspected to be censored by many of
these governments. In 2010, both the United arab Emirates and Saudi
arabia threatened to ban the use of Blackberry devices because their data
are sent through private central servers in Canada maintained by
Research in Motion (RIM, recently renamed Blackberry), the company
that produces Blackberry phones, thus preventing information moni-
toring by individual governments. While the ban ultimately did not
happen, thanks to an agreement between RIM and the UaE, RIM made
several concessions, including putting independent servers within the
UaE that could be monitored by the government (Trend 2010; Whitney
2010).
Thus, major changes in how people acquire and exchange informa-
tion are highly significant to the recent rounds of political unrest.
Horrifying events in the past that governments could easily cover up—
such as Syria’s bloody repression of a revolt in Homs in 1982—increas-
ingly are brought to light through the mass diffusion of cellphones with
cameras, Twitter accounts, YouTube, and other social media. The signifi-
cance of these technologies is enhanced when recipients of a particular
bundle of information help to disseminate it via face-to-face contacts and
informal social links. For example, given the relatively low Internet pene-
tration rates in some arab societies, it is safe to assume that news received
via YouTube videos is likely transmitted through word-of-mouth. all of
this is to say that the Internet per se did not cause the “arab Spring” but,
rather, played a catalytic role, galvanizing public opinion and facilitating
mass resistance.
Information Technology and “Arab Spring” Movements
Without romanticizing or mythologizing the Internet as an automatic
guarantor of civil liberties, it is nonetheless worth noting that cyberspace
has gradually widened the sphere of political debate in the arab world
(Ghareeb 2000). as penetration rates have steadily climbed, particularly
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among the young, new sources of information, including sources from
abroad, have percolated into several domains of civil society, with
complex and often unintended consequences. The gradual decline in
governments’ monopoly positions in the provision of news has been
directly abetted by the emergence of new online sources of information.
Tunisia offers important insights into the dynamics of IT in turbulent
arab states. Prior to the Jasmine Revolution that toppled Zine El abidine
Ben ali in January 2011, the government blocked access to Hotmail and
human-rights Web sites; in addition, every Internet service provider (ISP)
was required to submit a monthly list of subscribers to the government
censorship agency. In 2002, cyber-activist Zohair Ben Said al Yehiawy
was sentenced to jail for two-and-a-half  years for criticizing corrupt
police and judicial practices. The police harassment and subsequent
suicide of Sidi Bouzid fruit vendor Mohammed Bouazizi in December
2010, captured on a grainy cellphone video that was then posted on
Facebook (Diamond and Plattner 2012), catalyzed popular anger and
paved the way for mass political protests. In an analysis of refugees fleeing
Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution, Paradiso (2013) notes that according to
those who fled to the Italian island of Lampedusa, where she conducted
her fieldwork, cellphones and YouTube were the primary sources of infor-
mation about the rapidly changing political scene and a common means
of staying in touch with one another. 
In arab societies in which literacy is limited, digital images, particu-
larly video, play a key role in swaying public opinion. In the Bouazizi case,
video was critical in relaying the news about the fruit vendor’s self-immo-
lation. a similar event in Monastir several months earlier had sparked no
response, simply because it had not been filmed (Khondker 2011).
However, given the large number of videos uploaded to YouTube, simply
filming an event does not guarantee it widespread exposure; it is typically
only when a homemade video is picked up by a mass media outlet such as
al Jazeera that it “goes viral” and reaches a very large audience. Thus, the
famously insulting satire of the Prophet Mohammed that inflamed so
much public opinion throughout the Muslim world received notoriety
only once it had been given exposure by television outlets. The video of
Bouazizi was picked up by al Jazeera as well as being posted on
Facebook, creating public and international knowledge of the event.
Twitter also played a role in the spread of the Bouazizi video, and people
began to follow the hashtag #sidibouzid for information regarding any
revolutionary activity (Lotan et al. 2011). a news report of the event
posted on 19 January 2011 by al Jazeera English can be viewed on
YouTube.1 More recently, video has been used by women in Saudi arabia
to protest the driving restrictions placed on them; several videos have
been uploaded to YouTube and later posted on the Facebook page
#supportwomen2drive. These videos from May 2011 all depict Saudi
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women illegally driving cars. Similar to the Bouazizi video, they were
picked up by al Jazeera and spread through its traditional media outlets.
Twitter use in Saudi arabia has also mushroomed, posing an additional
threat to the regime (Worth 2012).
Video streams were used to reach wide audiences during the Egyptian
protests as well. When an Egyptian blogger, Khaled Said, was beaten to
death outside a cybercafé in alexandria on 6 June 2010, the café owner
recorded a video interview about the event, which, along with photos of
Said, was quickly posted online and spread through social media sites. a
Google executive who picked up on the story created a Facebook page in
response titled “We are all Khaled Said” (Khondker 2011). The page,
which is still active on Facebook, currently has a total of 293 924 “likes,”
down from 350 000 on 14 January 2011.2 although this is an example of
violence against an activist, it has been argued that many soldiers did not
respond violently to protestors specifically because they knew they were
on camera (Howard and Hussain 2011). News outlets reported citizens’
using their mobile-phone cameras in a variety of ways to report their own
action in the protests. Many took photos of themselves being arrested or
sitting on abandoned army vehicles, which they then uploaded to
Facebook or Twitter (Howard and Hussain 2011). Video content and
other imagery, spread online in a variety of ways, should be seen as a
primary method of spreading knowledge about ongoing events. 
In Egypt, it is widely observed that the initial protests were organized
through Facebook. The early protests were organized on Facebook by the
activist group april 6 Youth Movement (Stepanova 2011). On the date of
the first protest, 25 January 2011, approximately 85  000 people had
pledged to join the movement through Facebook (Bhuiyan 2011).
although it is uncertain how many people were involved in the protests,
thousands assembled in Tahrir Square on 25 January, and thousands
more were protesting in other areas of the country, such as alexandria,
Mansura, and aswan. Only two days later, government interference in
Facebook, Twitter, and Blackberry services was reported. By 29 January,
cellphone service disruption was also reported (al Jazeera English 2011).
On 27 January, the Egyptian government effectively shut down telecom-
munications services for several days in an effort to suppress the move-
ment in Cairo (see Figure 1), a relatively easy feat because the country has
only five ISPs. although IT was important in getting the initial word out
quickly, “without the perseverance of the Egyptian people, the revolution
would have never happened” (Bhuiyan 2011, 15). 
Twitter was also a popular mode of information sharing in Egypt’s
supposed “Facebook Revolution”: 
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Philip Howard (2011) quoted an activist in Cairo as saying, “We use Facebook
to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world”
… [summing] up the use of social media in the protest. (Bhuiyan 2011, 16)
as in Tunisia, protest organizers created a Twitter hashtag to post
tweets referencing events in the uprising. The hashtag #Jan25 became a
way to follow events occurring on the ground in Egypt (Lotan et al. 2011).
although Twitter was blocked by the Egyptian government early on in the
protests, its services continued to be used: Google released its speak2tweet
technology, whereby people can call a phone number and leave a voice
message that is then converted to an audio file and subsequently posted
on Twitter (al Jazeera English 2011). In this way people could still use
Twitter to follow the events unfolding in Egypt.
Despite the blocking of Twitter, “people were able to coordinate
protests and bring out larger numbers because of Facebook and Twitter”
(Bhuiyan 2011, 16). The revolution in Egypt had been building steadily
over time, and tools such as Twitter helped protestors gather strength
quickly. Clearly the Egyptian government believed that people were using
Twitter to gain support, since it shut down the service after a few days of
protests. Google was also convinced that Twitter was getting information
about the revolt out of the country, as it launched speak2tweet sooner
than planned. However, as Stepanova (2011) points out, during both the
Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions there were only a few thousand iden-
tifiable Twitter accounts in each country.  Bhuiyan (2011, 18) aptly sums
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Figure 1: 
Egyptian Internet traffic on 27 January 2011
Source: redrawn from Wall Street Journal (2011).
up the use of IT in Egypt: “perhaps social media was not absolutely crit-
ical to the uprising in Egypt; however, it made protest possible sooner, and
helped it develop in a way that would have been impossible without social
media.”
Digital media have also played a particularly important role in the
long, bloody Syrian rebellion against the assad regime, which to date has
claimed more than 70 000 lives. Chozick (2012) notes that “if  the upris-
ings in Tunisia and Egypt were Twitter Revolutions, then Syria is
becoming the Skype Rebellion.” Often rebels rely on smuggled telecom-
munications equipment such as cellphones and mobile handsets.
Conversely, the regime has initiated its own efforts, including checkpoints
where pro-assad forces inspect laptop computers for programs that allow
users to bypass government spyware. With only one ISP in the country,
Syria’s Internet is relatively easy to shut down. The pro-government
Syrian Electronic army has initiated cyber-attacks against rebel
Web sites. Syria has also been accused of deliberately infecting activists’
computers with malware in an effort to maintain surveillance of this
population (Galperin and Marquis-Boire 2012). Video again emerged as
a tool for showcasing uprising activity in Syria. YouTube made several
changes to its policy of not allowing users to upload videos that contain
high levels of violence. Many activists in Syria have documented, through
pictures or video on mobile phones, the violent treatment of protestors by
the military; these videos have been allowed to remain on YouTube for the
time being, despite their violent nature (Howard and Hussain 2011). 
Even in Bahrain, where political upheaval was relatively contained,
the Internet has emerged as a tool to challenge the ruling Khalifa dynasty
(MacFarquhar 2006). Wheeler (2005) charts the numerous ways in which
the Internet has infiltrated daily life in Kuwait, helping to stir opposition
to the government. More recently, several human-rights-themed accounts
on Twitter have started to expose government treatment of citizens.
abuses such as the arrest of Bahraini human-rights blogger Mahmood
al-Yousif  were followed by accounts such as @Bahrainrights and
@OnlineBahrain. Images from Google Earth were also circulated,
showing the income disparity between the minority Sunni ruling class and
the Shi‘a majority (Howard and Hussain 2011). Many of the videos and
other information shared via Twitter and Facebook were uploaded by
individuals; the reach of this content would have been small had it not
been picked up by players in major media outlets such as al Jazeera
(Lotan et al. 2011). Howard and Hussain (2011) point to al Jazeera’s new
media strategy as the focal point of their success in spreading word about
the events occurring in the Middle East. The Qatar-based news outlet
made most of its content readily available for use on mobile devices and
social media sites; their journalists were also connected through social
media to activists and other journalists on the ground in locations where
The Arab World Geographer / Le Géographe du monde arabe  Vol 16, no 2 (2013)
222 Emily Fekete and Barney Warf
uprisings were occurring. If  journalists from al Jazeera were not able to
be in a country because of harassment or a ban, they found other ways to
connect to the events and report to the rest of the world through social
media sources (Howard and Hussain 2011). although many of the
messages about events did not come directly from a mainstream media
account, such as @aJEnglish or @aJarabic (al Jazeera’s English and
arabic Twitter handles, respectively), the information was spread by jour-
nalists working for al Jazeera. Lotan et al. (2011) explains that in Egypt
especially, most of the information streams on Twitter began with either
a journalist or an activist and were then spread by other journalists or
activists. The reach of the average citizen was nowhere near as high as that
of individual journalists or activists. 
Concluding Thoughts
Major social, economic, cultural, and political changes have unfolded
across the arab world since 2011, including rapidly rising opposition to
longstanding dictatorial political regimes. The Internet, social media, and
other digital technologies did not, by themselves, cause the “arab
Spring,” but it is difficult to imagine these revolts, demonstrations, and (in
the case of Syria) civil war occurring without them. It is important not to
overstate the effects of cyber-technology, as many other forces played
important roles in fomenting unrest; conversely, however, it is naïve to
ignore the role of the Internet altogether. The “arab Spring” is thus
neither reducible to the catalytic role of IT nor independent of it; the two
phenomena must be seen as mutually transformative.
One dimension that simultaneously reflects and amplifies these trans-
formations is the diffusion of digital technologies. While often over-
looked by the popular media, mobile phones (cellphones) are by far the
most commonly distributed of these, often exceeding 100 % penetration
rates. Cellphones are increasingly important not only for their ability to
transmit voice data but for their cameras and, increasingly, their capacity
to upload photos and video to the Web, a phenomenon of particular
importance in jump-starting the Tunisian uprising. Internet penetration
rates, in contrast, are lower and range widely, from a mere 14.9  % in
Yemen to 77 % in Bahrain (see Table 1). However, as in many developing
countries, access to the Internet is growing explosively, particularly
among the young and well educated, with unpredictable long-term conse-
quences.
The role of IT in mobilizing public opinion and galvanizing unrest is
all the more remarkable given the long history of state repression of
media in most arab countries. Despite long-standing government
attempts to restrict Internet access, control online content, and intimidate
journalists (cyber and otherwise), the diffusion of digital media has
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undermined the information gatekeeping role that most arab govern-
ments have assigned themselves. Thus, the space of flows in the arab
world has increasingly shifted from a “one to many” model to one best
characterized by “many to many” transmissions, democratizing access to
unfettered information. Video—particularly that recorded by observers
on the street, and especially when it is then publicized by more main-
stream media channels such as al Jazeera—is especially critical here.
Moreover, different technologies have divergent impacts and significance
in various national contexts, including the central roles of YouTube in
Tunisia, Twitter in Egypt, and Skype in Syria.
In the context of the ideal speech situation proposed by Habermas—
still arguably the best defining intellectual standard by which democratic
ideals are measured—the diffusion of IT has significantly broadened the
sphere of public debate, given voice to the formerly voiceless, and
enhanced the power of ordinary citizens and observers on the arab street.
all this is not to say that IT is in and of itself  inherently democratizing
(the error made by most technological determinists); after all, digital
media are also used by Islamic fundamentalists, repressive state regimes,
transnational corporations, and other anti-democratic forces.
Nonetheless, it is no coincidence that rising cellphone and Internet pene-
tration rates have occurred simultaneously with increasingly well orga-
nized opposition to long-standing political regimes, exposing widespread
government corruption, nepotism, repression, indifference, and incompe-
tence. To the degree that the forces propelling the “arab Spring” were
enabled by IT, rising penetration rates may presage yet more rounds of
turbulence and upheaval to come.
Notes
1. See “Suicide that sparked a revolution” (video posted to YouTube),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47d6fyaOjRM.
2. See “We are all Khaled Said” (Facebook page),
https://www.facebook.com/elshaheeed.co.uk?fref=ts.
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This article explains the evolution of regional planning and policy in Malaysia and
discusses the implications of the underlying regional economic theories and
regional policies for the socio-economic development of Malaysia. Regional
economic development in Malaysia is due to several factors, including the integra-
tion of geography and physical features, the need for cooperation beyond local
jurisdictions, and the needs of local and national economic development. A review
of the literature suggests that the achievement and development of regional plan-
ning would differ depending on the country’s pattern of development and growth.
However, the basis of regional planning remains the same: to promote competitive-
ness, create economic opportunities, and achieve balance in the socio-economic
development of a country. In a way, regional planning is a tool to achieve sustain-
able development in a country.
Keywords: regional planning, regional development, regional economic develop-
ment, Malaysia
Cet article propose une explication de l’évolution de la planification régionale et de
ses politiques en Malaisie ; il passe en revue les théories de l’économie régionale et
les stratégies de politiques régionales pour le développement socio-économique
dans ce pays. Le développement économique régional est lié à plusieurs facteurs,
dont l’intégration de la géographie et de la morphologie  physique, la nécessité de
coopération au-delà des juridictions locales, ainsi que les besoins spécifiques du
développement économique local et national. Une analyse des publications sur le
sujet indique que la réussite et le développement de la planification régionale varie-
rait en fonction du modèle national de développement et de croissance. Néanmoins,
la base même de la planification régionale reste inchangée : il s´agit de promouvoir
la compétitivité, de créer des opportunités économiques et de réaliser un équilibre
dans le développement socio-économique du pays. D’une certaine manière, la plani-
fication régionale est un outil pour réaliser un développement durable dans un pays.
Mots-clés : planification régionale, développement régional, développement écono-
mique régional, Malaisie
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Introduction
Following Malaysia’s independence from Britain in 1957, the implemen-
tation of regional development policies and strategies has sped up the
urbanization and development changes in the economic growth. In
Malaysia, development objectives are spread within the five-year
Malaysia Plans. Regional planning in Malaysia began after World War II;
the establishment of regional planning in the Draft Development Plan of
1950 was intended to rebuild Malaysian economic development
(Eskandarian and Ghalehteimouri 2011). Since then, the regional plan-
ning has become a primary development strategy to spur economic and
social development in Malaysia.
Regional development approaches and strategies in Malaysia have
changed alongside development needs. In addition, various types of
regional development initiatives have been implemented in Malaysia,
such as the inter- and intra-regional policies, the opening of new growth
centres under the jurisdiction of Regional Development authorities
(RDas), and new regional economic development corridors involving
jurisdiction beyond the local and national levels (Zainul Bahrin 1989).
Identifying factors that promote regional development is essential in
taking appropriate action to enhance, consolidate, or scale down devel-
opment efforts in the regions concerned (Zainul Bahrin 1989, 5). The
objective of this article, therefore, is to provide understanding and infor-
mation on regional planning and development in Malaysia.
Regional Development in Malaysia
Regional development involves the interaction and function of spatial
development toward income, employment, and welfare issues
(Friedmann and alonso 1964). The process of regional development
describes the allocation of activities and investment decisions within a
region (Friedmann 2001). Regional development has become a global
phenomenon of Third World countries since the 1950s (Scott and Storper
1990) including Malaysia (Ghani Salleh 2000), where the implementation
of regional development strategies is included in every Five-Year
Development Plan.
Malaysian national development planning can be divided into three
phases: the Long-Term Plan, the Five-Year Development Plan, and the
Mid-Term Review of the Five-Year Plan (Nik Hashim 1994). The Long-
Term Plan is the Outline Perspective Plan (OPP), which began with the
First Outline Perspective Plan (OPP1, 1971–90) during the period of the
New Economic Policy (NEP, 1970–90) under the Second Malaysia Plan
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(1961–65). Its goal was to improve rural living standards (Zainul Bahrin
1989; Fatimah and Mad Nasir 1997). The Second Outline Perspective
Plan (OPP2, 1991–2000) was implemented during the period of the
National Development Policy (NDP, 1991–2000), and the Third Outline
Perspective Plan (OPP3, 2001–2010) covered the period of the National
Vision Policy (NVP, 2001–2010).
During and After the Colonial Era, 1786–1970
There is a lack of  literature on the development planning and urban-
ization process in Malaysia during the British colonial period
(1786–1957; Dani Salleh 2002). according to the contemporary
studies, the urbanization process began with the British exploitation of
natural resources for export activity and the growth of  the Straits
Settlements of  Penang and the mining towns of  Ipoh and Kuala
Lumpur (Dani Salleh 2002). During that period, development policies
were structured with minor involvement from the government (INTaN
1992), resulting in regional disparities (INTaN 1992; Eskandarian and
Ghalehteimouri 2011).
TABLE 1
Growth of output and income: 1956–65
Development First Malaya Second Malaya 
indicators Five-Year Plan Five-Year Plan 
(1956–60) (1961– 65)
Real GDP growth, %/year 4 6.4
Private motor vehicle consumption, 
persons/vehicle 82 56
Wireless ownership, persons/set 24 21
Annual domestic electricity  
consumption, kWh/person 31 44
Source: First Malaysia Plan, 1966–70
The first Five-Year Development Plan began with the First
Malaysia Plan (1966–1970). Before Malaysia became independent,
however, the First Malayan Development Plan (1956–60) was intro-
duced to improve living standards for the local people (Chandra
Muzaffar 1989). This plan was the first systematic development plan-
ning approach (Evers, Ramli, and Nienkemper 2010) that laid the foun-
dation of  national development planning in Malaysia. The First
Malayan Development Plan (1956–60), also known as the First Malaya
Five-Year Development Plan (Nik Hashim 1994) or the First Malaya
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Plan (Mohamed aslam and asan ali 2003), was prepared by the
Economic Secretariat in 1955 to strengthen rural development (Nik
Hashim 1994) and the agriculture sector (Lin 1994) in Malaysia.
according to the First Malaysia Plan (1966–70), the Malaya
Development Plan was successful in improving economic conditions.
as Table 1 shows, between 1960 and 1965 the real gross domestic
product grew at an average annual rate of  6.4 %, compared to 4 % per
year over the previous five years. There was also some improvement in
income levels, judging by the increase in private motor vehicle owner-
ship and per-capita annual domestic electricity consumption.
The period of the Second Malaya Development Plan (1961–65) was
a continuous effort by the government to promote economic growth and
achieve comprehensive national development planning (Nik Hashim
1994). Moreover, the plan was part of the government’s strategy to
achieve sustainable economic and social development, which was incor-
porated into the modern agriculture and industrial sectors (Lin 1994).
Before the 1970s, there was a gap in economic development among
Malaysia’s 11 states, notably between the developed states of the western
region (Selangor, Perak, Penang, and Negeri Sembilan) and less devel-
oped states in the northern and eastern parts of Peninsular Malaysia
(Hamzah Jusoh 1992; Ghani Salleh 2000; Wee 2006). This led to the
establishment of the Federal Land Development authority (FELDa) as
part of the strategy implemented under the introduction of regional plan-
ning in the First Malaysia Plan (1966–70; Hamzah Jusoh 1992). Regional
planning was introduced in response to the economic gap between states.
according to Mohd Yusof Kasim (1992), the regional planning strategy
to overcome this crisis involved opening more new land and reducing land
hunger, poverty, and unemployment in rural areas. Regional planning
strategies to reduce disparities among states were carried forward into the
second period of the five-year development plan.
The New Economic Policy (NEP), 1970–90
The Second Malaya Development Plan (1961–65) established manufac-
turing activities in less developed areas as one strategy toward industrial-
izing the country (Evers et al. 2010). This policy was continued in the First
Malaysia Plan (1966–70). The introduction of the New Economic Policy
(NEP, 1971–90) under the Second Malaysia Plan (1971–75) was the
regional development strategy to overcome disparities that contributed to
race riots in 1969 (Chee 1990; Mohamed aslam and asan ali 2003; Evers
et al. 2010).
The introduction of NEP was also aimed at eradicating poverty and
restructuring Malaysian society (Chee 1990; Shamsul amri 1994;
232 Rabe, Osman, Bachok
The Arab World Geographer / Le Géographe du monde arabe  Vol 16, no 2 (2013)
Fatimah and Mad Nasir 1997; Siwar and Kasim 1997; Cheng 2011). In
order to strengthen the strategy, the Regional Development authorities
(RDas)—Southeast Pahang Regional authority (DaRa), Northern
Pahang Regional authority (JENGKa), Central Terengganu Regional
authority (KETENGaH), Southeast Johor Regional authority
(KEJORa), Southeast Kelantan Regional authority (KESEDaR),
Kedah (KEDa), and Pinang Regional Development authority
(PERDa)—were established (Ghani Salleh 2000; Ibrahim Ngah 2010)
under the purview of the Minister of Land and Regional Development
(Hamzah Jusoh 1992).
as well as raising living standards, the regional development strategy
also focused on reducing income disparities between regions and states in
Malaysia (Mohd Yusof Kasim 1992). Through opening new land, the
strategy was able to enhance rural incomes and create jobs in the agricul-
ture sector. as Table 2 shows, the Second Malaysia Plan (1971–75) was
successful in create employment in the agriculture sector. This was espe-
cially true in the states of West Malaysia. 
TABLE 2
The Growth of Employment in West Malaysia, 1971–75*
Sector 1970 (est.) 1975 (target) Increase 
1971–75
No. (000) % of total No. (000) % of total No. (000)
Agriculture 1 454 49.5 1 579 46 125
Industry 456 15.5 594 17.3 138
Mining 64 2.2 60 1.7 -4
Manufacturing 270 9.2 378 11 108
Construction 103 3.5 133 3.9 30
Utilities 19 0.6 23 0.7 4
Services 1 030 35.0 1 262 36.7 232
Commerce 340 11.6 419 12.2 79
Transport, storage 110 3.7 122 3.6 12
& communication
Other services 580 19.7 721 21 141
Total 2 940 100 3 435 100 495
*Data on employment include employed persons under 15 and over 65 years old.
Source: Second Malaysia Plan (1971–75)
In the late 1970s, the Malaysian economy underwent some significant
changes as a result of of NEP programs. Lin (1994) and Wood (2005)
argue that the period of the Third Malaysia Plan (1976–80) saw a signifi-
cant transformation and increase in growth. On the other hand, regional
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planning was expanded to further eradicate disparity among regions and
society (Dayang-affizzah and Muzafar Shah 2006). In 1976, the inci-
dence of poverty was high in several states, including Kelantan, Kedah,
and Terengganu, as shown in Table 3; these states had the lowest mean
monthly household incomes relative to other developed states such as
Wilayah Persekutuan and Selangor.
TABLE 3
Incidence of Poverty and Mean Monthly Household Income, 1976
State Incidence of Mean monthly household 





Negeri Sembilan 33 505
Pahang 38.9 477







Wilayah Persekutuan 9 1058
*Current prices
Source: OPP2 (1991, 51–52)
The regional development strategy continued to be a major develop-
ment instrument in reducing the economic disparities between regions
and states. Data from the 1970s and 1980s indicate a decline in the inci-
dence of poverty, from 49.3 % in 1970 to 29.2 % in 1980, as a result of
rapid economic and social development programs implemented during
this period (Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981–85, 106). The Fourth Malaysia
Plan introduced more changes in the regional development strategy, with
an emphasis on balancing the socio-economic development of the popu-
lation (Shafari Che Hashim n.d.). In addition, Malaysia’s states were
divided into six regions, based on similarities in resources and economic
activities (Mohamed aslam and asan ali 2003): Northern region,
Central region, Eastern region, Southern region, Sabah, and Sarawak
(Cho 1990). Each region is dominated by a single metropolitan area or
growth centre (Cho 1990; Mohamed aslam and asan ali 2003). Under
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the regional development strategy, all states have undergone the process
of urbanization (Fauza abd. Ghaffar 2000). The regional development
strategy continued to be major development instrument in reducing
economic disparities between regions and states. 
The regional development strategy in the Fifth Malaysia Plan
(1986–90) was targeted to encourage urbanization and, at the same time,
to focus on environmental issues arising from the intensity of new devel-
opment in promoting economic growth (Salleh Mohd. Nor and
Manokaran 1994). During this period, urban centres grew rapidly, espe-
cially in the states of Selangor, Penang, and Johor, thanks to the develop-
ment of the manufacturing industry in these states (Fauza abd. Ghaffar
2000). In 1990, RDas, the Land Development authority, the Rubber
Industries Smallholders Development authority (RISDa), and the
FELDa were established under the Ministry of Rural and Regional
Development to centralize the development of regional planning initia-
tives under one ministry (Ministry of Rural and Regional Development
2007).
National Development Plan (NDP), 1991–2000
The Second Outline Perspective Plan (OPP2, 1991–2000) of the NDP
began with the Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991–95). The NDP’s objective was
to achieve “balance in development growth of social and economic devel-
opments and strengthen science, technology and socio-economic devel-
opment and environmental protection” (Economic Planning Unit 2004;
Ministry of Rural and Regional Development 2007; Ragayah 2008).
Overall, the NDP’s policies were intended to integrate the previous
achievements of OPP1, reduce social and economic imbalances (Fatimah
and Mad Nasir 1997; Dayang-affizzah and Muzafar Shah 2006), and
lead Malaysia toward becoming an industrialized and developed country
by 2020 (INTaN 1992; Evers et al. 2010).
Under the Sixth Malaysia Plan, the six regions were further enhanced
through the development of infrastructural facilities and urban densities
(Sulong Mohammad and Rahimah abd. aziz 1985). Meanwhile, the
regional development strategy was maintained through the expanding of
more social and physical infrastructure developments (Dayang-affizzah
and Muzafar Shah 2006). However, there was no allocation or strategy for
new land-development schemes under this plan, except in the state of
Sabah on Borneo (Salleh Mohd. Nor and Manokaran 1994).
In the following Five-Year Development Plan, growth in most states
centred on the development of manufacturing, construction, and service
sectors (Fauza abd. Ghaffar 2000). This has led to increased economic
productivity and less concentration on opening new land (Fatimah and
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Mad Nasir 1997). Regional development in the Seventh Malaysia Plan
(1996–2000) was also focused on achieving balanced development among
all states (Dayang-affizzah and Muzafar Shah 2006).
Overall, the economic growth of the less developed states did not
change under the implementation of the OPP2 relative compared to the
growth seen during the 1970s and 1990s (Eskandarian and
Ghalehteimouri 2011). according to allauddin anuar (2011), poverty
and inequality rates in Malaysia have fallen since the 1970s, but hardcore
poverty rates have remained the same since 2009. In contrast, although
the implementation of the NDP was a continuous effort by the govern-
ment to eradicate poverty, the available data show that the incidence of
poverty has actually grown since the early 1990s (Ragayah 2008).
National Vision Policy (NVP), 2001–10
The five-year development plan was extended into the Eighth Malaysia
Plan (2001–5) under the Third Outline Perspective Plan (OPP3, 2001–10).
The OPP3 introduced the National Vision Policy (NVP, 2001–10) to focus
on “building a resilient and competitive nation” (Ibrahim Ngah 2010).
Under the Eighth Malaysia Plan, the focus of development has shifted
toward a knowledge-based economy in order to provide a stronger plat-
form for the country’s transition into developed nation status (Musa abu
Hassan and Siti Zobidah Omar 2009). In addition, regional development
was further planned to reduce economic and regional imbalances, eradi-
cate poverty, and promote more socially and environmentally sustainable
development (Ibrahim Ngah 2010). However, under the Ninth Malaysia
Plan (2006–10), the focus was shifted to emphasize the services industry,
so as to accelerate the country’s economy and thus lead to changes and
new branding of regional development in Malaysia (Evers et al. 2010).
The implementation of the Ninth Malaysia Plan has included a
regional development strategy to enhance existing regional economic
development. Under this plan, the six regions were enhanced through
additional power to control regional development and increased funding
from both the federal government and government-linked companies.
Five major regional economic developments were introduced:
1 The Northern Corridor Economic Region (NCER, 2007–25), encom-
passing the states of Perlis, Kedah, Pulau Pinang, and North Perak
2 Iskandar Malaysia, formerly known as South Johor Economic Region
(SJER) (2006–25), covering the area of south Johor
3 The East Coast Economic Corridor (2007–20), covering Kelantan,
Terengganu, Pahang, and the north of Mersing district, Johor
4 The Sabah Development Corridor (SDC) 
5 The Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy (SCORE) in East Malaysia
The regional development strategy formulated under the Tenth
Malaysia Plan (2011–15) continued the aim of achieving developed
country status by 2020. The strategy includes the implementation of
cluster and economic corridor developments within the framework of
New Economic Model (NEM) and the Economic Transformation
Programme (ETP) (Evers et al. 2010; allauddin anuar 2011). according
to Evers et al. (2010), regional development plays an important role in
promoting and controlling development in the states within each
economic development corridor.
Overview of Regional Economic Development in Malaysia
In developing countries, regional economic development is regarded as an
important tool to boost national economic growth (Rondinelli 1990),
create job opportunities, and increase the tax base (Danielson and
Wolpert 1991). Several authors (e.g., Nijkamp and abreu 2009) have
identified regional economic development as a multidimensional concept
with multidimensional factors. Stimson and Stough (2008) describe
regional economic development as the outcome of a process of develop-
ment of available regional resources and activities.
Regional economic development or regional economic corridors are
defined by the asian Development Bank (2011) as a well-defined
geographic space of two countries within strategic borderlines with
concentration to achieve positive benefits. Malecki (1991) summarizes
regional economic development as a process derived by combining the
quantitative and qualitative resources of a region’s economy, while
Blakely (1994) defines it resulting from the continuous engagement of a
government or a society in the process of business and employment
(Stimson and Stough 2008).
Regional development has played a significant role in accelerating
development growth in Malaysia. Regional economic development began
in Malaysia before independence, with the introduction of the Draft
Development Plan of 1950 (Ghani Salleh 2000; Eskandarian and
Ghalehteimouri 2011). Regional development was introduced to enhance
economic development during the launch of the NEP (Ghani Salleh 2000;
Ibrahim Ngah 2010). according to Zainul Bahrin (1989), the Fifth
Malaysia Plan (1986–90) stated two major types of regional development
in Malaysia: inter- and intra-regional development models and the estab-
lishment of areas under RDas.
an example of regional development under the inter- and intra-
regional development model is the development of the Northern,
Central, Eastern, and Southern regions and of Johor, Sabah, and
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Sarawak regions. The Southern region, Sabah, and Sarawak were desig-
nated as regions based on their large physical size, location, and different
socio-economic activities. The Northern, Central, and Eastern regions,
on the other hand, were established based on their similar resources and
economic activities. The Northern region comprises the states of Perlis,
Kedah, Pulau Pinang, and Perak, while the Central region consists of the
Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, Melaka, and Negeri
Sembilan, and the Eastern region comprises Pahang, Terengganu, and
Kelantan states. according to Zainul Bahrin (1989), this regional devel-
opment involves multi-state or supra-state regions.
The second type of regional development is a region governed by one
of the seven RDas (DaRa, JENGKa, KETENGaH, KEJORa,
KESEDaR, KEDa, PERDa). all regions are governed by the regional
planning framework and operationalized by their respective RDas.
Involvement in ASEAN
Malaysia is also an active participant in various regional economic devel-
opments at the level of the association of Southeast asian Nations
(aSEaN; asian Development Bank 2011). aSEaN, established in 1967,
includes Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
Brunei became a member in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, the Lao PDR and
Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999 (Cuyvers 2002; Chia 1997).
aSEaN was established in order to overcome the asian economic crisis
(Lai and Yap 2004) by reducing gaps in socio-economic development
among member countries (Cuyvers 2002). aSEaN aims to achieve a
respectable economic growth rate among countries in the developing
world (Norazlina abdullah, Zalina abu Naim, and Yasmiza Long 2010).
One instrument to speed up economic development among aSEaN
members is the promotion of growth areas or “growth triangles”
(Cuyvers 2002; Hampton 2009). The concept of the growth triangle was
developed to reduce regulatory boundaries so as to exploit economic
resources and increase competitiveness by linking areas from three or
more countries (EaaU 1995; Smith 1997; Ishak Yussof and Mohd Yusof
2003; Sparke et al. 2004; Dayang-affizzah and Muzafar Shah 2006). a
growth triangle is also defined as a sub-regional economic zone (Smith
1997; EaaU 1995), extended metropolitan region (Robbins and El-
Khoury 2004), or economic territories (Fauza abd. Ghaffar 2000).
However, none of these definitions has any official status (EaaU 1995).
according to Ishak Yussof and Mohd Yusof (2003), the growth triangle
concept integrates the economies of regions to become regional economic
development or cooperation.
Three growth triangles at the aSEaN level share the mutual aim of
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enhancing existing economic growth and competitiveness (Fauza abd.
Ghaffar 2000). These growth triangles are described below.
I.
Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT)
One of the regional economic developments established under the
aSEaN economy is the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore Growth
Triangle (IMS-GT), also called SIJORI or JSR-GT (Chia 1997) and the
Southern Growth Triangle (Fauza abd. Ghaffar 2000). This growth
triangle was first proposed by the prime minister of Singapore, Goh Chok
Tong, in 1989 (EaaU 1995), integrates Singapore, the Riau Islands and
West Sumatra of Indonesia, and the Malaysian state of Johor.
The formation of the IMS-GT is one of the better-known examples
of catering to intensified urban size and fabric (Robbins and El-Khoury
2004). Dayang-affizzah and Muzafar Shah (2006) argue that the IMS-
GT development has been successful and leads to the formation of
another subregional economic cooperation; Chia (1997) states that the
future of the IMS-GT depends on continuous investment flows in Johor
and the Riau province, and points out that the most important factor
contributing to the development of IMS-GT is “geographical proximity
and economic complementarity” (Chia 1997, 27).
II.
Indonesia–Malaysia–Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT)
another growth triangle involving Malaysia is the Indonesia–Malaysia–
Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT). The IMT-GT covers an area and
population larger than the IMS-GT, designed with five connectivity corri-
dors (asian Development Bank 2011). The IMT-GT, also known as the
Northern Growth Triangle, was established based on the success of the
IMS-GT (Chia 1997).
Similar to the IMS-GT, the IMT-GT was designed to encourage
development within the growth triangle through the development of
economic or connectivity corridors (Robbins and El-Khoury 2004;
Banomyong, n.d.). Five connectivity corridors link the growth areas
within this region:
1. Extended Songkhla–Penang–Medan Economic Corridor
(Thailand–Malaysia–Indonesia)
2. The Straits of Melaka Economic Corridor (Malaysia)
3. Banda aceh–Medan–Pekan baru–Palembang Economic Corridor
(Indonesia)
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4. Melaka–Dumai Economic Corridor (Malaysia–Indonesia)
5. Ranong–Phuket–Banda aceh Economic Corridor
(Thailand–Indonesia)
This approach was launched during the declaration of the IMT-GT
flagship project in 2006 (Banomyong n.d.). The IMT-GT operates based
on an agreement to share supporting industrial infrastructure and
advanced information technology (Robbins and El-Khoury 2004).
III.
Brunei–Indonesia–Malaysia–Philippines East aSEaN Growth area
(BIMP-EaGa)
The development of the BIMP-EaGa was inspired by the success of the
IMS-GT (Dayang-affizzah and Muzafar Shah 2006). Malaysia is a
founding member of the BIMP–EaGa and IMT–GT growth triangles
(asian Development Bank 2011). The BIMP–EaGa, also known as the
Eastern Growth Triangle, is another sub-regional economic cooperation
within the aSEaN economy (Chia 1997).
In addition to the aim of promoting the development of Sabah and
Sarawak (Dayang-affizzah and Muzafar Shah 2006), BIMP–EaGa also
has the goal of complementing growth centres within the regions to
improve socio-economic status and living standards (Ishak Yussof and
Mohd Yusof 2003). This growth triangle also aims to integrate the
economic development of the participating countries (Ishak Yussof and
Mohd Yusof 2003). a key element of the success of regional economic
cooperation is creating linkages and facilitating the development of trans-
portation infrastructure (Chia 1997).
Conclusion
This article has focused on the evolution and development of regional
planning in Malaysia and assessed the establishment of local and inter-
national regional economic developments in the country. Regional plan-
ning strategies in Malaysia are implemented throughout the long-term
development plans (Wood 2005), which have reduced regional disparities
in the country (Dani Salleh 2002) while at the same time closing income
gaps among states (Mohamed aslam and asan ali 2003). although some
researchers have found that regional development strategies in Malaysia
were successfully achieved (Wood 2005; Mohamed aslam and asan ali
2003), others have argued that the implementation of such strategies
under the federative system were mostly unsuccessful because of the
conflict of wealth distribution between states and regional authorities
(Eskandarian and Ghalehteimouri 2011). However, according to
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Snickars, andersson, and albegov (1982), the achievement of regional
development planning differs depending on the pattern of development
and growth of countries.
Our objective in this article was to describe the implementation of
regional planning and development in Malaysia. The literature suggests
that the achievement of regional planning and its development will differ
depending on the pattern of development and growth. The literature
review raised some areas of concern that can be improved in relation to
regional planning and development in Malaysia, as discussed above.
There is thus a significant need to study the impact of regional develop-
ment in Malaysia. a study of the impacts of regional economic develop-
ment will help to identify the issues and problems with current regional
planning practices so that recommendations can be made to address
them. However, the basis for regional planning remains the same: to
promote competitiveness, create economic opportunities, and achieve
balance in the socio-economic development of a country. Regional plan-
ning is one tool to achieve sustainable development in a country.
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